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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the expression of polarization surrounding the most recent same-
sex  marriage  case  in  the  Supreme  Court,  Obergefell  v.  Hodges.  28  amicus  briefs,
submitted  from interested  groups  and  concerned  individuals  in  support  of  either  the
petitioners or the respondents, were analyzed for the major points of concurrence and
disagreement between the two sides. The aim of the study was to come to a more nuanced
understanding of  the  ways  in  which  both  sides  express  their  arguments  either  for  or
against  same-sex  marriage.  What  the  findings  of  the  content  analysis  suggest  is  that
interest groups on both side of the same-sex marriage debate are not polarized merely
because they are dissimilar. Instead, they are polarized because they possess many of the
same values about the importance of marriage, family, and Constitutional law in society,
but they differ as far as their methods of maintaining the sanctity of these institutions for
future generations.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of same-sex marriage has been a hot-button issue within the United States
ever since the Stonewall Riots, the foundation of the modern LGBT rights movement.
Polarization,  or  the  extent  to  which  opinions  on  either  side  of  an  issue  are  highly
divergent from one another, has characterized the heart of this debate. Numerous interest
groups have  weighed in  on this  topic,  along with invested  politicians  and concerned
individuals alike, and no consensus has yet to emerge. The battle over this issue has been
waged on numerous fronts, including newspaper headlines, television segments, public
protests, legislative chambers, and state and federal courtrooms. In the minds of many of
these interested parties, they were fighting for nothing less than the future of the nation.
In July 2015, the Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges, which affirmed that same-sex couples possess the fundamental right to marry.
During this decision, many interested parties submitted  amicus curiae,  or friend of the
court, briefs to express their opinions to the Court and contribute to the ultimate decision.
These amicus briefs are not so much a cause of polarization within society, but rather an
expression of the polarization that already exists. This thesis will provide a context for
understanding amicus briefs as a symptom, not a cause for polarization, and analyze these
briefs for the major thematic arguments that make up the rhetoric of both sides of the
debate.  Lastly,  the thesis will  discern 1) what these amicus briefs say about essential
character of the debate over same-sex marriage, 2) analyze which arguments are likely to
continue to be made in the wake of the Supreme Court case, and 3) look ahead to the
future of the debate over this issue within broader society.
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The first chapter of this thesis will provide an overview of theories of polarization and
attempt to answer some key questions regarding the character of the conflict within the
United States. The chapter will describe James Davison Hunter's classic example of the
“culture war” and address some of the major critiques of his argument from Alan Wolfe
and Morris Fiorina. These three scholars acknowledge that there are certain issues that
polarize  political  discourse,  but  they disagree  on the  main  distinguishing factors  that
contribute to this polarization.  However,  they all seem to arrive at the consensus that
elites, not necessarily individual people, contribute to the ubiquitous air of polarization
surrounding certain issues, like abortion and same-sex marriage. One of the major fronts
where these elites are able to clash directly with one another on such divisive issues is the
Supreme Court. 
The  second  chapter  explores  the  role  of  the  Court  in  the  battle  over  same-sex
marriage. It traces the history of same-sex marriage litigation from the 1970s, following
the infamous Stonewall Riots, all the way up to the present day. Members of the LGBT
community have long brought their cases before the Court, arguing that their denial of
marriage licenses violates their Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection
under the law. Interest groups on both sides of the aisle have made their cases before state
and federal courts. In recent years, three cases have made it up to the Supreme Court:
Hollingsworth v. Perry, United States v. Windsor, and Obergefell v. Hodges. Each of these
decisions expanded the rights of same-sex couples until, finally, in Obergefell, the Court
granted same-sex couples the right to marry. Interested parties contributed to the case not
only by sponsoring the litigation, but also by submitting amicus curiae briefs to advocate
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for their preferred course of action. 
Amicus curiae briefs, as will be explored in Chapter Three, are one of the major ways
that interest groups advocate and lobby within the judicial system. The amicus brief has
evolved throughout its history, from its earliest reputation under English common law as
a neutral brief by uninterested bystanders to its modern understanding as an advocacy
document on behalf of one side in a case. Under the current judicial system, amicus briefs
are increasingly being submitted by interested parties in support of the petitioners or the
respondents.  In  this  way,  elites  are  able  to  express  their  arguments  in  support  of  a
particular  course  of  action  and  potentially  impact  the  Court's  ultimate  decision.  The
chapter  defines  the  modern  uses  and limitations  of  the  amicus  brief  as  an  advocacy
document and provides basic reasons for why these documents are useful in exploring
polarization, especially within the context of modern Supreme Court decisions.
The following chapter will describe the methodology behind the content analysis of
29  randomly-selected  briefs  from  Obergefell  v.  Hodges.  First,  it  will  provide  an
explanation of content analyses in a general, theoretical sense and describe some of its
key advantages and disadvantages. Next, it will lay out precisely the procedures used to
conduct the content analysis and code for particular arguments within the petitioners' and
the respondents' briefs. The purpose of the content analysis was not to discover the key
causes  of  polarization within the  briefs,  but  rather  to  describe the  ways in  which  an
already polarized document expresses that polarization. The very fact that amicus briefs
are being submitted in a Supreme Court case in favor of one side or the other presupposes
polarization; this study is particularly interested in the construction of the polarization
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and what the most commonly-used arguments say about the ways in which both sides
relate to (or do not relate to) one another.
To that end, the last two chapters analyze the amicus briefs in depth. First, the chapter
on the findings will delineate some of the major thematic arguments used across all of the
briefs, not just the ones from the petitioners' or the respondents'  amici. The chapter will
lay the groundwork for understanding the ways in which the two sides construct their
arguments  around certain  key points,  like the  harms to the  LGBT community or  the
redefinition of marriage. In addition, the findings section will explore those times when
the petitioners or the respondents discuss arguments that do not appear on both sides in
relatively equal proportions and describe those differences. In other words, the findings
chapter will  provide a roadmap for understanding the most pertinent arguments made
across the briefs.
The next chapter will explore precisely what those arguments mean within the larger
context of polarization. How can we use the construction of the arguments within the
briefs to understand polarization in a larger context? How are the briefs an expression of,
but not a cause of, polarization that already exists within our political system? Perhaps
most  importantly,  what  do  these  chief  arguments  say  about  the  future  direction  of
polarization  within  the  United  States,  both  in  the  legal  context  and  otherwise?  The
analysis  will  pose  preliminary  answers  to  these  questions.  Finally,  the  chapter  will
explore some key limitations of the study and directions for further research in this area.
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CHAPTER ONE:
Theories of Polarization
Is the United States polarized?
This question has plagued many social scientists over the years as they have studied
American society.  Before answering it,  however,  it  would be useful to define exactly
what this thesis refers to when it mentions polarization. For the purposes of this thesis,
polarization will be defined as “the extent to which opinions on an issue are opposed in
relation  to  some theoretical  maximum.”1 In  other  words,  polarization  is  the  distance
between the two side's opinions on an issue. If the two sides agree on a certain point,
there would be no distance between their opinions and therefore no polarization. If two
sides say precisely the opposite in relation to some issue, then there would be an expanse
of distance between them and therefore a large degree of polarization. Polarization is not
“mere incivility.”2 It is not related to the vitriol or, conversely, the calm, used by two
parties in expressing their opinion. Instead, polarization is a term used to describe the
distance between two disparate opinions about anything from taxes to same-sex marriage.
 One only has to look at the current political climate to see evidence of polarization.
The two main parties in our society, the Republicans and the Democrats, fight for control
of the government. They constantly seek to wrestle power from the other side to achieve
their own policy initiatives. Regardless of their primary motivations, and regardless of the
party who ultimately gains power, there appears to be a gradual widening of the chasm
between  the  two  parties.  Competition  exists  “between  equally  balanced  but  extreme
1 DiMaggio, Paul, John Evans, and Bethany Bryson. 1996. “Have American's Social Attitudes Become 
More Polarized?” American Journal of Sociology 102(3). University of Chicago Press.
2 Ibid.
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support coalitions throughout most of the United States.” The Republicans have their
base, the Democrats have their base, and neither is willing to sacrifice their “relatively
extreme  views”  in  order  to  represent  a  moderate  position.3 In  this  way,  the  parties
constantly seek the assurance that comes from being a majority party in the government.
Thus, contemporary politics is characterized predominantly as a tug-of-war between two
extremely  disparate  factions  within  larger  society  itself.  It  seems  we  exist  within  a
hopelessly  partisan  society,  perpetuated  predominantly  by  the  Republicans  and  the
Democrats.
In the early years of American society, however, this polarization did not exist. In
fact,  many  observers  of  American  politics  criticized  the  fact  that  the  parties  were
“nonprogrammatic, unprincipled, and ideologically indistinct.”4 This fact has begun to
change in recent years as the two parties increasingly diverge from one another. Many
political  theorists,  reporters,  and  commentators  have  explored  the  nature  of  this
polarization. In particular, they have demonstrated through empirical research that the
Republicans and the Democrats “are each growing more homogeneous in their policy
positions, while the differences between the two parties' stands on major policy issues are
expanding.”5 In other words, within the party, politicians and other officials are beginning
to  create  a  programmatic  set  of  policy stances  and issue  positions  that  are  relatively
uniform among individuals. At the same time, these views are gradually becoming more
conservative,  on  the  side  of  the  Republicans,  and  more  liberal,  on  the  side  of  the
3 Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. “The Polarization of American politics.” The Journal of 
Politics 46, no. 04 (1984): 1061.
4 Layman, Geoofrey C. “Party Polarization in American Politics, Characteristics, Causes, and 
Consequences.” Annual review of political science 9, no. 1 (2006).
5 Ibid.
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Democrats. It seems, in this case, that two roads have diverged and they will likely never
meet again, unless both parties decide to retreat back to their previously neutral positions.
However, a chief question is whether this level of polarization accurately represents
the position of the average voter in the United States. Within the country, there are many
middle-of-the-road voters that are not necessarily represented by the two major parties.
These  voters  are  not  Republicans  or  Democrats.  They are  not  members  of  “a  silent
majority desiring some radical social change,” but rather, they are moderate individuals
who desire only to avoid the tumultuous policy shifts that are caused by our political
system.6 However, avoiding these policy shifts with each new election as one or the other
party comes into power is not as simple as it sounds. Increasingly, voters are encouraged
to pick a side, to choose between two “programmatic and ideologically cohesive parties”
that  present  the  voters  “with  clear-cut  policy choices.”  The  winning party would,  of
course, attempt to “carry out its policy commitments in office.”7
 Thus, the middle-of-the-road voters have two choices: 1) remain moderate and risk not
being represented by their chosen political official; or 2) choose a side.
Evidence  exists  that  support  the  selection  of  both  choices.  Alan  Abramowitz,
prominent political scientist at Emory University, argues that the presence of polarization
in today's  politics does  not discourage voters from participating.  To the contrary,  the
sharp divide between the Republicans  and the Democrats  on important policy issues,
ranging  from social  issues  like  homosexuality  and  abortion  to  economic  issues  like
welfare, has clarified the choices put before the voter and increased the stakes in each
6 Poole, Keith T. “The Polarization of American politics.”
7 Abramowitz, Alan I. The disappearing center: Engaged citizens, polarization, and American 
democracy. Yale University Press, 2010.
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election. As a result, the average citizen would be much more likely to vote and engage in
other political activities. Therefore, the effect of this party polarization is at least partly
positive, since it contributes to higher voter turnout and increased participation in other
political  activities,  like talking about politics with friends and family,  displaying yard
signs, and giving money to candidates and parties.8 When voters are given clear choices
between two parties, and when one of the parties supports their deeply-held beliefs and
the other party does not, logically the voter will choose to throw their hat into the former
party's  ring.  Even  though  many  modern  political  scientists  claim  that  “ordinary
Americans are losing interest in government and politics as a result of growing partisan
animosity and ideological partisanship,” Abramowitz argues that precisely the opposite is
true.9 
However,  there  is  a  flip  side  to  this  equation:  namely,  the  tendency  of  a  large
population of voters to refuse involvement within the political system precisely because
of this polarization.10 James Davison Hunter, best known for his literature regarding the
culture war hypothesis (discussed later in this chapter), puts forth the idea that the vast
majority of Americans do not align themselves with a particular ideological or partisan
system of thought. Instead, most Americans exist in the middle territory between these
two ideological extremes of American culture.11 Although some naturally lean toward one
side or the other, there are certain people who remain seemingly “oblivious” to either
party and therefore continue as moderate voters.12 
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10   Ibid. 
11 Hunter, James Davison.
12 DiMaggio, Paul. “Have American's Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?”
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This  viewpoint  is  supported  by  other  empirical  research.  DiMaggio  and  others
conducted  a  study on  changing  attitudes  about  abortion.  They selected  this  issue  in
particular  because  the  perceived  level  of  polarization  regarding  abortion  makes  it
incredibly difficult to imagine the occurrence of “democratic compromise.” Therefore,
this  issue,  in  particular,  threatens  the  viability  of  American  political  institutions.13 In
studying this issue, however, they discovered that, even though the parties themselves
have become increasingly polarized on this issue, “no empirical evidence of increased
attitudinal  polarization  is  presented.”14 In  other  words,  the  public's  opinions  about
abortion have remained at steady levels of polarization through the years. No noticeable
increase in civilian polarization was observed.
How, then,  can  one  make the  case that  there  is  continued polarization  in  today's
society?
First, this chapter has already discussed the way in which parties have contributed to
this  climate  of  polarization.  They  have  altered  their  platforms  to  emphasize  their
deviation from the other party's. Their positions on the issues have moved further to the
left and the right, respectively. There is more room in the middle for compromise than
ever before, but both parties are unwilling to sacrifice their essential positions in order to
achieve such compromise. The two-party system of government presents two opposing
choices  and  demands  that  voters  choose  between  them  or  else  risk  their  votes  not
mattering in the grand scheme of politics. In a very real sense, then, the choice of the
voters whether to align themselves with the existent polarized structure has been made
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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for them already.
Second,  the two parties  are  not  the only institutional  structures  that  contribute  to
polarization.  Rather  than  individuals  holding  polarized  views  themselves,  politics  is
increasingly dominated by interest groups that exemplify these polarized viewpoints. The
“anatomy of cultural conflict,” or polarization, is rooted in the formation of these interest
groups that espouse incredibly different views on morality, truth, and authority, in the
context of social and political issues.15 All individuals are not necessarily polarized, but
those individuals who choose to get involved and form interest groups contribute to the
pervasive polarization within our society. When one interest group has a certain view on
same-sex marriage, for instance, and another interest group has the exact opposite view,
the  resulting  discourse  contributes  to  an  atmosphere  of  polarization.  James  Davison
Hunter  calls  this  clash a  “culture war,”  which is  explored more in  depth in  the next
section.
The “Culture War” Hypothesis
Support
To describe  his  hypothesis  of  a  “culture  war,”  James  Davison  Hunter  begins  by
explicating the difference between private and public culture. Private culture, according
to Hunter, consists of the signs and meanings that order personal experience. This form of
culture encompasses people's understandings of themselves and their relationships with
close friends, family, coworkers and acquaintances. It also informs their conception of
their larger circumstances and surroundings.16 Private culture is the way in which private
15 Hunter, James Davison. Culture wars: The struggle to define America. Basic Books, 1992.
16 Ibid., p. 54.
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individuals make sense of their world and everything that exists within it. Without the
formulation of this culture, individuals would have no way to make sense of the primary
events of their life—birth, adolescence, marriage, procreation, vocation, even death. This
kind of culture is essential in ordering the lives of individuals and, more importantly,
proscribing meaning onto individual lives. It is precisely this kind of culture that gives
individual lives their significance.17
Public culture, on the other hand, consists of the symbols and meanings that order the
life of the community or a nation as a whole. This type of culture is the culmination of the
numerous symbols of “national life and purpose” that exist within a particular society.18
To put it in simple terms, public culture is the embodiment of the values of a particular
society.  Through  public  culture,  citizens  understood  the  history  and  mythos  of  their
nation and recognize the values—such as equality, liberty, and diversity, among others—
that  should  define  the  nation.  Public  culture  is  the  context  in  which  individuals,
communities and governmental bodies “envision the mission yet to be fulfilled.”19 Public
culture informs the character of a nation—past, present, and future.
Conflict  arises  when  private  and  public  culture  collide  within  public  discourse,
particularly when several different conceptions of the “right” private culture vie for their
place within public culture. Public culture does not emerge out of the ether. Instead, it is
informed and shaped by private culture. Public culture is characterized as “a sphere of
activity in which individuals and communities can present and advocate their particular
interests.” It is the area in which various private interests can push for the adoption of
17 Ibid., p. 54.
18 Ibid., p. 54.
19 Ibid., p. 55.
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their own particular claims and viewpoints as a staple of public culture.20 When most
individuals present the same conception of private culture, public culture alters to fit the
dominant ideology. However, when a number of individuals present extremely ddifferent
claims and attempt  to  change the  culture,  then conflict—and inevitably—polarization
threaten the previously universally-approved public culture. In this way, “the arena of
public  culture”  is  the  place  “where  the  struggle  for  cultural  hegemony  or  cultural
domination takes place.”21 The formation of hegemony is centered around the victory of
one particular brand of private culture that becomes universal enough to be considered
public culture.
Individuals  have  a  certain  degree  of  control  in  changing  the  public  culture.  For
example, a woman who gets unexpectedly pregnant might protest to unfair treatment by
her local reproductive health clinics and fight for change in the reproductive politics of
her  city.  A gay  couple  who  wishes  to  get  married  might  seek  a  marriage  license,
acknowledging the loopholes that exist in the marriage laws of many states which do not
specify gender. A mother might attend a town meeting to protest the way in which sex
education is being taught. There are numerous ways for individuals, recognizing that their
own private culture is being disrespected, to seek change within the larger public culture.
However, when it comes to effecting real change, Hunter acknowledges that the elites of
society—the  academics,  special  interest  lobbyists,  public  interest  lawyers,  writers,
community organizers, and movement activists, among many others—have resources that
mere citizens do not have. In this way, Hunter states that “public discourse … is largely a
20 Ibid, p. 56.
21 Ibid, p. 57.
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discourse of elites.”22
Elites are often more capable of transforming public culture to fit their own ideals.
The old adage that “there is safety in numbers” applies to the discussion of the methods
of achieving this success. One elite, regardless of their influence and sway, would not be
able to change the entirety of public culture to align with their private culture. If a group
of individuals unite to form an interest group or organization, however, their efforts are
instrumental  in  both  forming  and  maintaining  their  preferred  public  culture.23 The
problem arises when elites from both sides of a divide attempt to change culture to fit
their own conception. No two elites agree completely, and when interest groups made up
of these disparate people attempt to effect change, conflict inevitably occurs. According
to Hunter, these elite interest groups and movements have disagreements occurring along
several fault lines: the elucidation of the ideals of public culture, the meaning of national
identity, the interpretation of collective myths, and the use of law in the resolution of
public grievances, to name a few.24 These fundamental issues are only a segment of a
larger ideological conflict about the meaning of America—specifically, its past, present,
and future meaning.25
Hunter divides the conflict into those elites who espouse an “orthodox” worldview
and  those  who  espouse  a  “progressive”  worldview.  The  orthodox  vision  tends  to
emphasize the fact that America has received a “divine call” to be a nation built upon
Christian ideals.26 In their estimation, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence,
22 Ibid, p. 59.
23 Ibid, p. 60.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid, p. 63.
26 Ibid, p. 109.
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and other founding themselves reflect divine providence.27 The responsibility of America
is to consequently live according to biblical ideals in an attempt to honor and reflect
God's divine favor. The orthodox view also emphasizes the importance of freedom and
justice, where freedom is constructed as “the freedom enjoyed by a  society  to govern
itself.”28 Freedom,  in  this  worldview,  is  also  constructed  as  “economic  self-
determination,” which emphasizes the value of a free market and a capitalist world order.
In addition, economic and spiritual freedoms go hand in glove with each other to the
point where it is impossible to have one without the other29 In turn, justice is understood
almost exclusively in the Judeo-Christian terms of moral righteousness. A society is only
just if it upholds the standards of biblical morality.30 Ultimately, this orthodox view is
centered around the biblical conceptions of a free and just society: in other words, the
popularized conception of a “city on the hill,” first coined by John Winthrop in 1630.
America was chosen to be God's nation, in other words, and therefore the nation is under
obligation  to  honor  that  blessing.  The  nation  should  not  change  from  its  original
founding, and if, for some reason, change must occur, the chance should “more perfectly
fulfill” the Christian ideals that have served as the backbone of the nation from its very
founding.31
The progressive view, however, argues that America has historically been a nation
characterized by pragmatism, optimism and secularism, not “forces of religious or artistic
irrationalism.”32 Consequently, the Constitution is not viewed as an unchangeable, static
27 Ibid, p. 110.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid, p. 111.
30 Ibid, p. 112.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid, p. 113.
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document that must be given a strict  interpretation based on the Founders'  intentions.
Instead, our founding document is “a living Constitution” that is free to grow and change
as  society  evolves.  Following  these  societal  changes,  various  subsections  of  the
Constitution can be interpreted differently to better fit with the demands of the time.33
Freedom, according to the progressives, is characterized primarily in terms of individual
social and political rights. The Constitution, and the efforts of the Founders themselves,
are meant to protect and preserve pluralism and diversity. Therefore, the Constitution is
inherently a  document  that  provides  for  the  rights  of  minorities  within  the  system.34
Justice is intimately related to freedom in this regard, because it presupposes equality and
the  fight  to  end oppression  in  the  free  world.35 The  responsibility and the  calling  of
America,  then,  is  to  protect  the rights  of  minorities,  like African-Americans,  women,
refugees,  and  homosexuals,  among  many others.  America  is  a  nation  built  upon  the
conception  of  rights  for  all,  along with the  twin  principles  of  equality  and diversity.
Therefore, the progressives view their mission as the implementation of social justice for
all, using the Constitution as a tool to achieve this end.36
One  of  the  most  important  distinctions  to  be  made  between  the  orthodox  and
progressive  worldviews  addresses  conceptions  of  ultimate  authority.  The  orthodox
viewpoint holds that there is one source of authority: the Bible. Within this worldview,
certain unbreakable truths emerge:
Among the most relevant for the present purposes are that the world, and all of the 
life within it, was created by God, and that human life begins at conception and, from 
that point on, it is sacred. Another “truth” is that the human species is differentiated 
33 Ibid, p. 114.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid, p. 115.
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into male and female not only according to genitalia,  but also according to role,  
psyche, and spiritual calling. Related to this idea is the belief that the natural and  
divinely mandated sexual relationship among humans is between male and female  
and  this  relationship  is  legitimate  only  under  one  social  arrangement,  marriage  
between one male and one female. Homosexuality, therefore, is a perversion of the 
natural or created order. Building on this is the conviction that the nuclear  family is 
the natural form of family structure and should remain inviolable from outside (state) 
interference. And this idea encompasses the belief in the inviolable rights of parents
—their right to raise their children into their own religious and moral tradition, the 
implication being that this role should be encouraged and not hindered by a secular, 
liberal educational establishment.37
Note the construction of homosexuality under this worldview. The orthodoxy holds
that homosexuality is inherently an aberration, a subversion of the divinely-sanctioned
relationship between one man and one woman for life. As a result, marriage could only
be an institution between a man and a woman. The primary purpose of marriage is to
provide a stable environment for couples to raise their biological children, free from the
interference of the state. Marriage is a sacred institution, created by God, that cannot be
changed or redefined.
A certain set of conceptions about life—and, more relevant for the purposes of this
study,  homosexuality—emerge  from the  progressives  as  well.  Hunter  exemplifies  the
major differences in concise terms:
...personhood begins at or close to the moment of birth, at least until science can  
prove otherwise. Likewise, until science can prove otherwise, male and female are  
differentiated solely by biology; other differences are probably human constructions 
imposed through socialization and reinforced in human relationships by powerful and
sometimes oppressive institutions. So too, human sexuality is based in biological  
need. The forms in which those needs are met are historically and culturally variable 
and  completely  legitimate  as  long  as  those  forms  reflect  a  positive  and  caring  
relationship. Homosexuality, then, does not represent an absolute and fundamental  
perversion  of  nature  but  simply  one  way  in  which  nature  can  evolve  and  be  
expressed.  … In like fashion, marriage and family structures are historically and  
37 Ibid, p. 122.
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culturally varied. Their form, by and large, depends upon need and circumstance.38
The progressives view homosexuality in a different fashion. They argue that there is
nothing morally wrong with homosexuality;  it  is simply another natural expression of
human sexuality. If a relationship between two people of the same sex express the same
level  of  love,  commitment  and stability  as  a  relationship  between two people  of  the
opposite sex, there is no reason to view one as inferior to the other.  They reject one
monolithic view of the family, arguing that they come in many shapes and sizes, and all
of  them  are  equally  valid.  There  is  no  legitimate  reason  to  discriminate  against
homosexuals, which is an organic expression of human sexuality. One can extrapolate
this argument out to mean that there is no legal basis for denying same-sex couples the
right to marry, as long as their relationships reflect values of love and commitment.
Within  the  larger  public  culture,  these  two  worldviews  war  for  dominance.  As
expressed earlier  in this  chapter,  this  war does not take place predominantly between
individuals. The essence of the culture war hypothesis is that a fundamental shift has
occurred within American public culture between the orthodoxy and the progressives, and
now both sides seek to influence public culture in their favor. This shift was, and is still,
institutionalized  through  special  interest  groups,  political  organizations,  and
governmental entities, whose struggle is given meaning through the “ideals, interests and
actions” of their elites.39 As these interest groups and other organizations have developed,
they have grown into an “autonomous” reality that is much larger than “the sum total of
individuals  and  organizations  that  give  expression  to  the  conflict.”  Even  though
38 Ibid, p. 126.
39 Hunter, James Davison, and Alan Wolfe. Is there a culture war?: A dialogue on values and American 
public life. Brookings Institution Press, 2006, p. 20-1.
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individuals are the ones who give these organizations a voice, it becomes a reality in and
of itself, contributing to the culture of polarization in a way that individual voices alone
do not.40 The war for the past, present and future of America, particularly its significance
and its ongoing mission, is waged among these interest groups across numerous cultural
fields  and  disciplines.  Such  is  the  nature  of  polarization:  interest  groups  disputing
essential questions with other interest groups to gain dominance and power within the
larger public culture.
Criticism
Over the years, many political scientists have criticized the culture war hypothesis for
its failure to account for the middle ground occupied by many average citizens in the
United States. The vast majority of Americans are “constantly seeking a balance between
rights  and obligations,  between  social  concern  and  self-reliance.”41 In  an  individual's
public culture, they do not hold purely orthodox and progressive views. Instead, their
views  could  best  be  classified  as  a  consolidation  of  beliefs  from  both  of  these
worldviews. Therefore, this whole idea of a “culture war” rests on the flawed premise
that most people are polarized in their daily lives.
Alan Wolfe, a political scientist and professor at Boston College, offers a succinct
criticism of the culture war hypothesis. He argues that the culture war does not originate
in  the  minds  of  individuals.  Instead,  it  exists  primarily in  the  minds  of  the  elites  of
society, particularly journalists and political activists. If there is such a thing as a culture
war, it is between “partisans and ideologically inclined pundits.”42 This polarization exists
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid, p. 3.
42 Ibid, p. 42.
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between the elites of society, not the individuals, because politicians need to find ways to
energize their base, and ideologically driven interest groups need to fund-raise and gain
support for their cause.43 There is no better way to draw people to one's cause than to
differentiate itself from the rest, to say “this is what I stand for” and ask people if they
will  stand with them. Republicans and Democrats accomplish this feat by positioning
themselves on the extremes of social and economic issues. Interest groups exist on both
sides of any possible debate that exists within today's society, from prayer in schools to
same-sex marriage.  These political  elites contribute to the culture war by formulating
extreme positions on issues related to issues of fundamental moral values.44 Regardless of
whether  these  positions  represent  the  viewpoint  of  the  average  American,  extreme
perspectives naturally generate conflict and contribute to the polarizing political dialogue
surrounding certain issues.  These viewpoints eventually become the fuel for electoral
debate, legislative action, and even litigation efforts.
Wolfe expands this  point  by arguing that there is  a fundamental  gap between the
representation of these issues by the political elites and the values and opinions held by
real Americans over those same issues. If there is a “culture war” going on, it is within
the hearts of individuals, not between individuals and groups of people. According to
Wolfe, most Americans believe in both traditional religious values and personal freedom,
and deciding between the two does not always come easily.45 Americans are constantly
torn between the orthodox and progressive viewpoints, in other words, and they would
much prefer to find a compromise between them. However, in the most pressing “hot-
43 Ibid, p. 49.
44 Ibid, p. 49.
45 Ibid, p. 46.
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button”  issues  today,  the  political  elites  end  up  forcing  the  hand  of  individuals  and
representing  the  conflict  in  polarizing  terms.  One  must  either  choose  to  support  the
orthodox or the progressive view; they cannot in  good conscience find merit  in both
perspectives.
Take the issue of same-sex marriage, for instance. At first glance, same-sex marriage
appears to be “the great exception” to Wolfe's claims. There is  still  a significant gap
between the Americans who believe in traditional marriage between a man and a woman
and those who believe that  marriage  rights  should be extended to same-sex couples.
Wolfe disputes the claim that the culture war exists in the minds of everyday Americans,
but on the issue of same-sex marriage, there is evidence that Americans are indeed deeply
divided on this issue. He concluded that “a culture war very definitely did exist” in this
area.  Even though Americans  tend to  support  the right  of  homosexuals  to  engage in
private conduct, they do not necessarily agree that the state should be able to grant them
access to the traditionally heterosexual institution of marriage. In other words, there is a
difference between turning a blind eye to private conduct and placing the State's seal of
approval on public conduct. Recent political conflict, such as the legalization of same-sex
marriage in Massachusetts and other states, along with the most recent political elections,
have brought this polarization more clearly into the light.46
However, the issue of same-sex marriage is not as clear cut in recent years.  Public
opinion regarding same-sex marriage has gradually become more tolerant and nuanced
over  the years.  Many Americans,  including many conservatives,  believe that gay and
lesbian couples would be better off with legal recognition and all of the benefits that
46 Ibid, p. 47.
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come along with it, even if the states did stop short of marriage equality.47 Before the
recent Supreme Court case,  Obergefell v. Hodges, 37 states had taken steps to legalize
same-sex marriage, many of them through state referendums. The fact that the majority of
voters in each state chose to legalize same-sex marriage indicates that public opinion has
gradually been shifting  to  allow for  this  transformation of  one  of  the country's  most
important  institutions.  The  reason for  this  shift  is,  in  part,  the  fact  that  most  people
recognize the tension between the sacred value of marriage—as commonly explored in
Judeo-Christian  thought—and  the  sacred  value  of  the  Constitution,  which  allows  for
equal rights for all. As more people attempt to reconcile these two disparate viewpoints—
in the words of Hunter,  the orthodox viewpoint and the progressive viewpoint—there
exists  some  middle  ground  where  same-sex  marriage  can  exist  within  our  society.
Eventually, Wolfe posits, this issue will become less polarizing as society, more generally,
turns in a more tolerant direction.48
Just because individuals within society will seek common ground, that does not mean
political elites will seek the same. These elites find value in presenting two diametrically
opposing  perspectives  on  issues.  Extremism  begets  extremism.  By  creating  an
atmosphere  of  “ideological  passion,  all-or-nothing  extremism,  and  apocalyptic
scenarios,” they fight for their own party to gain favor. The same goes for interest groups:
the more they can raise the stakes on the outcome of a certain issue, the more they can
rouse  their  most  devout  supporters  into  action.  Politicians  need  to  rouse  their  base.
Single-issue groups, such as those who advocate for or against same-sex marriage, are
47 Ibid, p. 48.
48 Ibid.
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not willing to give up until their own position is adopted by the government.49 In this
way, the elites are the ones perpetuating the current culture war. To a degree, individual
voters  align  with  these  perspectives,  but  a  large number of  Americans  are  conflicted
about these issues. Thus, the culture war, in Wolfe's construction, exists, but only in the
minds and actions of political elites. Most average Americans want nothing to do with it.
Wolfe's critique of the culture wars is by far the most well-known, but it is not the
only one. Another criticism of the culture war hypothesis emerges from Morris Fiorina.
In many ways, Fiorina contributes to Wolfe's discussion about the culture war. He, too,
believes  that  it  is  primarily  political  elites  who  contribute  to  the  culture  war,  not
individuals, and in fact, these elites do not reflect popular preferences.50 Political elites
advocate for policy changes and express issue positions that do not align with the true
beliefs of the American populace as a whole. Elites focus on “cultural battles” over issues
like abortion, gay rights, and gun control, when the vast majority of Americans would
prefer more discussion over topics like health care, jobs, education, and national security.
In  this  way,  voters  are  presented  with  extremes  when  they  would  prefer  more
moderation.51 The political elites choose to push forward their own policy initiatives and
change society to fit their own ideals, rather than address the problems that most concern
the general public.
In turn, the voters can either choose to accept this polarization and choose sides in the
debate, or they can become disillusioned and disengage from the entire political process.
49 Ibid, p. 68.
50 Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. Culture war?. New York, NY: Pearson 
Longman 2005, as quoted in Hunter, James Davison, and Alan Wolfe. Is there a culture war?: A 
dialogue on values and American public life. Brookings Institution Press, 2006, p. 20-1.
51 Ibid, 84.
22
Fiorina  argues  that  disengagement  is  far  more  likely.52 Americans  have  listened  and
watched as elites perpetuate the same kinds of racial, ethnic, and gender biases that these
elites outwardly say they reject, all the while knowing their actions reveal another story.
Regular Americans speak the “politically correct” language of diversity and talk in terms
of polarization, but that does not necessarily mean that the people actually believe what
they are saying. The people have just learned to speak the elite language.53 Sooner or
later, the people will turn their backs on the elites who are not talking about the issues
that matter the most to them.54
Consequently, Fiorina argues that the culture war is in decline. The elites in charge of
the  war—the  politicians,  pundits,  interest  groups  and  activist  organizations  that
disseminate their  viewpoints throughout the society and attempt to garner widespread
change  through  the  government—are  rapidly  becoming  “leaders  without  real
followers.”55 Elites  naturally  overestimate  their  own  importance,  and  the  people  are
beginning to turn to other news sources to get their information. The competition between
the elites, their constant distribution of their own policy initiatives and ideologies, matters
less when individuals can look to other non-biased sources to get information. As elites
lose their influence in society, as individuals become more educated, Fiorina postulates
that the culture war is “now showing signs of exhaustion.”56 Soon, it will be outdated
altogether.
52 Ibid, p. 85.
53 Ibid, 86.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid, p. 87.
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* * * 
Both of these criticisms of the culture war hypothesis are valid. However, there need
not be any conflict between Hunter's explanation of the culture war and the criticisms
levied  against  it.  Both  Wolfe  and  Fiorina  acknowledge  that  the  culture  war  is
predominantly waged between the political elites, not the individuals. The war, to the
extent that it does exist, is measured in the ways in which political elites dispute among
each other about the most pressing issues within our society. Hunter admits this point
within his book: “Without doubt, public discourse is more polarized than the American
public  itself.”57 The  reason  for  this  polarization,  and  the  subsequent  culture  war,
ultimately  comes  down  to  the  discourse  of  the  political  elites  within  societies,  not
individuals.
For the purposes of this thesis, the main topic of the culture war is the legalization of
same-sex marriage. As Wolfe admitted, the issue of same-sex marriage is precisely where
the culture war seems to come into the clearest  focus. In discussions about same-sex
marriage,  a “moral impasse” seems to have been reached between the political  elites.
Interestingly,  both sides use similar forms of argumentation. They appeal to scientific
evidence, social and legal precedents, and theology and biblical textual analysis, to name
a few. The conflict occurs because each side has a fundamentally different interpretation
of logic, science, history and theology. In this case, this difference has only enhanced and
legitimated their divergent ideological interests. The two sides do not  dialogue about
their differences. Instead, each side of a polarizing issue only “talk past each other.”58
57 Hunter, James Davison. “Culture Wars,” p. 159.
58 Ibid, p. 131.
24
Their  central  beliefs  and  interpretations  of  logic,  science,  history  and  theology  thus
become insurmountable stumbling blocks to a common understanding among opposing
interests.
According to Hunter, cultural conflict becomes enshrined within various institutional
structures: the family, education, the popular media, law, and electoral politics. Each of
these areas are “instruments of cultural war,” or “a kind of symbolic field or territory for
which  opposing sides  assert  their  interests  through competing claims,  seek  to  extract
concessions, and endeavor to minimize their own losses.”59 For the purposes of this study,
the main institution to be studied is the law.
To be more specific, the courts have increasingly been the battlefield on which the
war  about  same-sex  marriage  has  waged  between  political  elites.  Hunter  poses  the
question: “Is there any part of contemporary life in America that has not been engulfed in
litigation?”60 Interest groups sponsor litigation and/or provide amicus briefs in support of
one party or another in order to shape the context of the debate around their topics of
choice.  Through  the  court  system,  discussing  regarding  fundamental  issues  to  the
maintenance of society—same-sex marriage, for example—are thrust into the public eye
and couched in legal discourse. The courts are one of the primary battlegrounds where the
fight over same-sex marriage has taken place.61 The following chapter will explore the
path of same-sex marriage through the courts and examine the ways in which various
politicians and interest groups have attempted to win the courts to their position over the
years.
59 Ibid, p. 173.
60 Ibid, p. 250.
61 Ibid.
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CHAPTER TWO
History of Same-Sex Marriage Litigation
Thirty years ago, the idea of same-sex marriage would have seemed ludicrous to all
but the most idealistic gay activists. For many years, same-sex marriage was not even on
the agenda of the burgeoning LGBT rights movement, which burst onto the public scene
following the Stonewall Riots on June 28, 1969. A year after the riots, a gay couple, Jack
Baker and Michael McConnell, applied for a marriage license in Minnesota. Their case,
Baker v. Nelson, eventually made it up to the Supreme Court. The justices eventually
declined their appeal for a marriage license. When they were profiled in Look magazine
in  1971,  they  revealed  that,  despite  their  activism,  they  did  not  expect  that  the
government would grant them the right to marry. Their main goal was merely to give the
LGBT movement some much-needed visibility.62
A number  of  other  gay  and  lesbian  couples  went  to  the  courts  in  the  1970s.  In
Kentucky, a lesbian couple applied for a marriage license and was denied. Their decision
to appeal to the courts was ultimately unsuccessful. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in
this case, Jones v. Hallahan, did not challenge the preconception that marriage was meant
to be heterosexual-only.63 The Court stated their reasoning accordingly: “In substance, the
relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage
license because what they propose is not marriage.”64 A similar case,  Singer v. Hara,
between a gay couple in Washington was rejected. At the time, plaintiff John Barwick
explicitly stated their motivation in filing the lawsuit: “[We] really believed we'd never be
62 Pierceson, Jason. Same-Sex Marriage in the United States: The Road to the Supreme Court and Beyond.
Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, p. 28.
63 Ibid, p. 29.
64 Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
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equal until we had the right to get married. Choosing your partner is the most personal
basic right you have through life. You'll never be equal until you have that.”65
An interesting fact related to this case in particular was the submission of a forty-page
amicus  brief  containing  evidence  from sociology,  science,  medicine,  and  theology to
advocate  for  the  naturalization  of  homosexuality  and  the  legalization  of  same-sex
marriage. The brief also mentioned the recent legal literature which indicated that there is
legal precedent for the right they were seeking. The Court eventually dismissed the brief
as  irrelevant,  but  the  submission  itself  has  important  consequences  for  the  study of
amicus briefs to follow later on in this thesis.66 Even in the earliest years of same-sex
marriage litigation, briefs were used to advocate for same-sex marriage in a way that had
not been seen before, containing evidence from many different disciplines. This tradition
would follow in the submission of amicus briefs by individuals and interest groups in
Obergefell v. Hodges.
Following these defeats in same-sex marriage litigation, the LGBT movement split
into two camps. There were still people who advocated for legal recognition of same-sex
relationships, whether through marriage or domestic partnerships. Many advocates for
this recognition at the time argued that the 14th amendment demanded marriage equality.
They viewed the attainment of equal marital status “as a last legal and social step toward
respectability for sexual minorities.”67 This movement achieved some success through
legislation, not litigation, as Washington, D.C. and other urban areas recognized same-sex
65 Pierceson, Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, p. 30. See also: Monica Guzman, “Seattle Gay 
Rights Pioneeer Reflects on Activism,” Seattle's Big Blog, November 3, 2009, 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/thebigblog/2009/11/03/seattle-gay-rights-pioneer-reflects-on-activism/.
66 Pierceson, Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, p. 30.
67 Ibid.
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couples through municipal domestic partnership laws in the 1980s. These legislative acts
represented  the  most  significant  attempt  to  enact  same-sex  marriage  through  the
legislature until the 1990s. Even though this attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, it laid
the groundwork for other future attempts.68 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, the LGBT movement was characterized mostly by a
shift  away  from  marriage.69 Many  prominent  activists  throughout  this  time  period
expressed concerns  about  the marriage equality movement.  These concerns  coalesced
into  three  separate,  but  interrelated,  movements  critical  of  the  pursuit  of  marriage
equality.  The  gay  liberation  movement  advanced  the  perspective  that  relationships,
particularly same-sex relationships, should not be shackled to the dominant expectations
of  society.  Instead,  the  gay  rights  movement  was  an  opportunity  to  promote  more
“egalitarian”  forms  of  intimacy.70 The  LGBT movement  could  advocate  for  a  more
radical  model  for  relationships,  characterized  by  “fluidity  in  relationship  form,  a
deprivileging of monogamy, equality between partners with an end to inflexible gender
roles, and the development of a new set of values.”71 Even though this movement was
short-lived, echoes of its thought are seen in the other two critiques of marriage. The
lesbian feminist movement argued that the traditional model of heterosexual marriage
disadvantages  and  oppresses  women.  Consequently,  the  leaders  of  this  movement
question why same-sex couples would desire to enter into such an oppressive, patriarchal
institution in the first place.72 In a similar vein, the queer activist movement outlined a
68 Ibid, p. 32.
69 Ibid.
70 Bernstein, Mary, and Verta Taylor. “The Marrying Kind?” Debating Same-Sex Marriage Within the 
Lesbian and Gay Movement, 2013, p. 8.
71 Ibid, p. 9.
72 Ibid, p. 10-1.
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number of fears about the focus on marriage equality. The essence of their argument was
that same-sex marriage would “marginalize and stigmatize” those who chose not to get
married,  assimilate  the  LGBT community into  “mainstream,  patriarchal”  culture,  and
ultimately contain expressions of queer sexuality within monogomous, state-sanctioned
unions.73
As a  result  of  these  three  distinct  strains  of  thought,  the  early LGBT movement
(1970s-1980s) was a fight for gay civil rights, not marriage equality. However, by the
early 1990s, this focus had radically shifted. In 1987, the LGBT movement highlighted
the quest for marriage equality at the third national March on Washington for Lesbian and
Gay Rights. A Los Angeles-based organization, Couples, Inc., organized “The Wedding,”
a ceremony which celebrated same-sex relationships and demanded the same rights as
married  heterosexual  couples.  This  movement,  despite  the  controversy  at  the  time,
energized the LGBT movement to fight for domestic partnership laws and recognition of
same-sex couples by employers and local and state governments.74 For the next twenty
years, beginning with a landmark Hawaii Supreme Court case, the main focus of the
LGBT movement would be the achievement of marriage equality across all fifty states.
In the early 1990s, three same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses in the state of
Hawaii. They were denied the licenses and subsequently sued the state for the right to
marry.75 The case, Baehr v. Lewin, eventually made its way to the Hawaii Supreme Court,
where the justices held that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the
equal protection clause of the Hawaii state constitution. In its decision, the Court argued
73 Ibid, p. 13-4.
74 Ibid, 3.
75 Ibid, 3.
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that denying same-sex couples the right to marry was a kind of sex discrimination and
that  the  definition  of  marriage  should  not  be  biased  on  the  basis  of  the  sex  of  the
partners.76 The Court then remanded the case back to the trial court, which was charged
with finding a “compelling state interest” to deny marriage rights to same-sex couples.77
After  this  groundbreaking  decision  by the  Hawaii  Supreme Court,  numerous  interest
groups, who had previously believed same-sex marriage to be out of reach for many
years  yet  to  come,  joined the  cause.  The issue  of  same-sex marriage  skyrocketed  to
national prominence.
In response to this case, the federal government took action. In 1996, the Senate and
House of Representatives passed the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which reserved
marriage as the union between a man and a woman “for the purposes of interpreting and
implementing federal law.”78 The federal government could not be forced to recognize
same-sex marriages,  even if  they lawfully occurred in  the states.  This  act  effectively
formed  a  protection  for  the  traditional  definition  of  marriage  and  barred  the  LGBT
community from their efforts to achieve full marriage equality. Even if they managed to
achieve same-sex marriage in certain states, they would be recognized as such by the
federal government.
The pursuit of same-sex marriage rights through litigation has also historically been
plagued by obstacles from the legislative branch and the state voters. For example, as part
of the initial legislative reaction to the decision in Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii legislature
76 Dupuis, Martin. Same-sex marriage, legal mobilization, & the politics of rights. New York: Peter Lang, 
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77 Bernstein, The Marrying Kind?, p. 4.
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proposed a  constitutional  amendment  banning same-sex marriage  and reaffirming the
sanctity of marriage as an institution between a man and a woman.79 This amendment was
later ratified by 69 percent of the voters. Consequently, the landmark decision in Baehr v.
Lewin was dismissed.80 Many other states in the Union soon adopted their own “local
DOMAs”—in other words, state legislation or constitutional amendments banning same-
sex  marriage.  By  2005,  over  forty  states  had  approved  such  barriers  to  same-sex
marriage.81
Alaska was the  first  state  to  recognize that  the  right  to  choose  one's  spouse  is  a
fundamental right and consequently affirm that same-sex couples had the right to choose
whoever they wanted as a spouse, regardless of their gender. Other state courts, including
Hawaii's, had previously represented the issue in terms of whether same-sex marriage
itself was a fundamental right.82 The case, Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, dealt with
a state  law that  was enacted in  response to Hawaii's  Supreme Court  decision,  which
explicitly banned same-sex marriage and affirmed the definition of marriage as between
one man and one woman. This ban, according to Alaska's Supreme Court, violated Article
1, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution, which established the right to privacy.83 The
voters did not accept this reasoning, however. They later overturned this judicial decision
by ratifying the constitutional amendment which banned same-sex marriage.84
The next major litigation battle over same-sex marriage occurred in Vermont. In the
summer of 1997, three same-sex couples brought suit against the state of Vermont for
79 Pierceson, Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, p. 95.
80 Pinello, Daniel R. America's struggle for same-sex marriage. Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 27.
81 Ibid, p. 29.
82 Dupuis, Same-Sex Marriage, Legal Mobilization, and the Politics of Rights, p. 63.
83 Ibid.
84 Pierceson, Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, p. 102.
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refusing to grant them marriage licenses. The plaintiffs argued that a prior statute banning
same-sex marriage violated the state's constitutional guarantee of equal protection.85 In a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court decided that same-sex couples were entitled to
equal protection under the constitution. The justices did not outright demand that same-
sex couples be given the right to marry. Instead, the legislation, under court mandate to
create laws granting equal protection to same-sex couples, enacted a civil union law that
replicated the existing marriage laws. Even though same-sex couples were considered to
have the same fundamental rights of marriage as opposite-sex couples, the legislature
stopped shy of granting same-sex couples the right to marry itself.
In  2003,  Massachusetts  became  the  first  state  to  legalize  not  just  civil  union
legislation  but  same-sex  marriage.  Following  the  Hawaii  decision,  various  interest
groups,  including  GLBTQ  Legal  Advocates  and  Defenders  (GLAD),  thought  about
sponsoring same-sex marriage litigation, but they ultimately decided not to do so right
away.  The  move  to  submit  litigation  was  triggered  by  a  proposed  constitutional
amendment banning same-sex marriage within the state. According to Mary Bonauto of
GLAD, advocates of same-sex marriage did not want to be defined by their opposition to
the amendment, but rather by their affirmation of marriage rights for all.86 The trial court
dismissed the claims of the plaintiff, arguing that the decision should be made by the
legislatures and the Courts, but the case was expedited up to the Supreme Court.87 In
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
overturned the decision of the trial court and affirmed the right of same-sex couples to
85 Dupuis, Same-Sex Marriage, Legal Mobilization, and the Politics of Rights, p. 99. 
86 Pierceson, Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, p. 108.
87 Ibid, p. 109.
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marry.88 Chief Justice Margaret Marshall argued that “the decision whether and whom to
marry is among life's momentous acts of self-definition.”89 The Court also rejected the
procreation argument and redefined marriage to include same-sex couples.90 In this case,
marriage is defined as an “exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other [that]
nurtures  love  and mutual  support.”91 In  response  to  this  case,  thirteen  states  enacted
constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, but the wheels had already been
set in motion.92
Following  the  legalization  of  same-sex  marriage  in  Massachusetts,  litigation
continued, with varying levels of success, in New Jersey, Connecticut, California, Iowa,
Oregon, Washington, Maryland, and New York. The first four states legalized same-sex
marriage; the latter four did not. One of the most high-profile cases on the national stage
was the case filed in California, In re Marriage Cases, sparked quite a bit of controversy,
much like the Hawaii decision in Baehr v. Lewin.
The issue of  same-sex marriage  devolved into controversy when Democratic  San
Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom ordered the city to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples in 2004. Newson's actions inspired litigation based on the state's prohibition of
same-sex marriage.93 In the trial court, Judge Richard Kramer ruled that the ban on same-
sex marriage was unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed this ruling, and the case
was heard in front of the California Supreme Court amid a maelstrom of controversy
88 Pierceson, p. 100.
89 Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
90 Pierceson, p. 110.
91 Goodridge.
92 Pierceson, p. 108.
93 Ibid, p. 187.
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between the conservatives and liberals of the state.94 The case was avidly watched by the
entire nation until a divided Supreme Court invalidated the state's prohibition of same-sex
marriage and declared sexual orientation to be a suspect classification under California's
law.95 
It is through this California case and the subsequent backlash that the role of interest
groups in determining the outcome of controversies is crystallized. After the Supreme
Court decision, conservative interest groups mobilized in support of Proposition 8, an
amendment to define marriage as exclusively between one man and one woman. The
amendment  passed,  52  to  48  percent,  and  therefore  invalidated  the  Supreme  Court's
decision months  before  and called  into  question  the  thousands of  marriages  that  had
occurred during the previous months. One of the primary reasons why this amendment
was so successful was because of the money and influence of religious organizations who
mobilized in support of the amendment.96
However, the amendment's ratification was not the end of the line for California's
fight over same-sex marriage. Proposition 8 was challenged in the California Supreme
Court,  but  the  effort  to  overturn  the  amendment  ultimately  failed.  Certain  same-sex
marriage proponents turned to the federal court system to challenge the amendment. The
logic was that, if the federal courts determined California's amendment to be a violation
of equal protection, then all other state amendments banning same-sex marriage would
also be considered unconstitutional. Many litigators were hesitant to take this route, given
the conservative majority on the Supreme Court at the time. When other liberal activists,
94 Ibid, p. 188.
95 Ibid, p. 189. 
96 Ibid, p. 191.
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like director Rob Reiner and Democratic consultant Chad Griffin (selected to lead the
Human Rights Campaign, a leading LGBT political advocacy group, in 2012), decided to
go ahead with a federal challenge, many prominent gay rights organizations (Lambda
Legal, ACLU, Human Rights Campaign, National Center for Lesbian Rights) criticized
the decision. Regardless of this criticism, the liberal activists continued with the present
course of action.
The U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker struck down Proposition 8, ruling that it was
unconstitutional, and later, a three-judge panel of the US 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the ruling. The supporters of Proposition 8 appealed to the US Supreme Court,
which eventually granted the case a writ of certioriari. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court ruled that the proponents of Prop 8 had no standing to bring the case before the
Court.  As a  result,  the  Supreme Court  cleared  the  path  for  same-sex marriage  to  be
legalized within the state—and for other court cases dealing with same-sex marriage to
eventually reach state and federal courts.97
The next major same-sex marriage case to make it up to the Supreme Court was U.S.
v.  Windsor.  This  case  was  brought  by  Edith  “Edie”  Windsor,  a  widower  and  later
beneficiary of the estate of her late wife, Thea Spayer. Their marriage was recognized by
Toronto  law—the area  in  which  they were  married—and  by New York law,  but  not
federal law. As a result, the federal government imposed $363,000 in taxes on Windsor.
With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Windsor sued to get her
money back, arguing that  DOMA violated her  constitutional  right to  equal  protection
97 “Gay Marriage in the US Supreme Court, 2013 – Gay Marriage – ProCon.org.” ProConorg Headlines. 
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under the law.98 The Court ultimately held that DOMA goes against the “legislative and
historical precedent” which gives states the authority to define and regulate marriage.
More importantly to  their  later  decision  in  Obergefell  v.  Hodges,  they held  that  “the
purpose and effect” of DOMA was to impose a disadvantage and, therefore, a stigma on
same-sex couples,  which violates  the Fifth  and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of
equal protection.99
This federal decision launched a new wave of political action across the United States
in  the  fight  about  same-sex  marriage.  Many states,  including  Maine,  had  previously
affirmed the right of same-sex couples to marry through a state referendum. Other states
turned to litigation in order to win the fight. Four states—Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee—had previous marriage bans on the books, and these were soon challenged by
groups of same-sex couples. Each of the plaintiffs in these cases argued that the marriage
bans unconstitutionally violated the equal protection clause and due process clause. In all
of the cases, the trial court found in their favor, but then the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth  Circuit  reversed  the  decision.100 The  case  eventually  made  its  way  up  to  the
Supreme Court under the name Obergefell v. Hodges.
Subsequent chapters will explore this decision—and its repercussions in more depth
—but for the present, the Court's ruling in this case will be sufficient. In a 5-4 decision,
the Supreme Court ruled that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment guarantees
the right of same-sex couples to marry. In the majority opinion, the justices held that “the
98 Pierceson, Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, p. 228.
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right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual
autonomy, it protects the intimate association between two people, it safeguards children
and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and
it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order.”101 Therefore, the Court
squarely aligned itself with those who hold that the right to marry should be guaranteed
to  same-sex  couples  under  the  Constitutional  protections  of  due  process  and  equal
protection. It appears, in this case, that whatever culture war existed, the proponents of
same-sex marriage have won—but that is not the entire story, as will be discussed later on
in the analysis.
* * * 
The courtroom, both state and federal, has been a battleground for the culture war
regarding same-sex marriage since the 1970s, to varying degrees. It is within this arena
that one is able to see the two sides fight for their own vision of the future, their own
conception of rights, their own understanding of the Constitution and the institution of
marriage. Here, interest groups and individuals can express their opinions on this issue,
whether by sponsoring litigation or by submitting amicus briefs in the court itself. For the
purposes of this study, amicus briefs present a way to zero in on some of the ways in
which  the  two  sides—in  particular,  the  elites  of  the  two  sides—have  framed  the
argument. First, however, a brief history of this document is needed.
101Ibid.
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CHAPTER THREE
A Brief History of Amici Curiae
The role and function of the amicus brief has changed dramatically throughout its
history. At first glance, it appears to be a “functionally unchanged document,” given its
“delusive  innocuousness,  its  seemingly static  function  and terminology …. [and]  the
offhand  manner  of  its  usual  use  in  court.”102 However,  the  amicus  brief,  despite  its
relatively unchanged appearance, has been transformed from a neutral document for the
dispensation of relevant facts and figures to the court to an advocacy document designed
to promulgate one's own views to the justices. The amicus brief is meant to persuade the
Court that the group's proposed course of action should be adopted for the good of their
own group and of society. In this way, amicus briefs prove to be a particularly salient
method through which relevant interest groups aim to persuade governmental institutions
to adopt their particular view. Most important to this study, however, is the way in which
interest groups and individuals convincingly represent their arguments, using evidence
from philosophy, legal tradition, social science, and many other disciplines, within the
structure of the amicus brief. By considering the various ways in which different interest
groups represent  their  arguments,  it  is  possible  to  deduce  which  issues  are  the  most
important to both sides of an argument and consider some of the primary sources of
concurrence  and  dissension  that  could  result  from  their  representation  of  the  issues
involved and the “facts” associated with the case. In the context of Obergefell v. Hodges,
a study of a sample selection of amicus briefs can illuminate some of the key persuasive
arguments  commonly used by relevant  interest  groups on both  sides  of  the  issue.  In
102 Krislov, Samuel. “The amicus curiae brief: From friendship to advocacy.” The Yale Law Journal 72, 
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considering the briefs  by petitioners  and respondents  in  conjunction  with  each other,
these arguments then illuminate some of the key points of polarization upon which the
entire controversy—in this case, over same-sex marriage—hinges.
Amicus briefs, as traditionally understood within the United States judicial system,
trace their roots back to English common law. English lawyers were well-acquainted with
the intervention of the Attorney General or other counsel as “friends of the court” in
litigation where the government does not have a formal role but still  retains a “direct
interest” in the decision.103 These “friend of the court” briefs were meant to bring to the
attention of the courts key information about facts and law, especially when the courts
themselves might not be privy to such information on their own. Most often, an amicus
brief was submitted by a bystander who, by his own initiative, made a suggestion to the
court.104 Occasionally, as in the case of Henry Clay in the U.S. court system, the Courts
specifically asked individuals to contribute their own relevant counsel to the case at hand,
but they were still considered disinterested bystanders.
As amicus briefs continued to proliferate in English common law cases, the courts
avoided  a  precise  definition  of  the  perimeters  and  circumstances  regarding  the
submission of an amicus brief, which increased “judicial discretion” and “maximized the
flexibility of the device.”105 Amicus briefs did not necessarily have a specific structure
and format to which they should adhere. The presence of bystanders within the English
adversarial  judicial  system allowed third parties to have a say in salient cases. There
existed at that time very few limits regarding who could submit amicus briefs and the
103 Angell, Ernest. “The Amicus Curiae American Development of English Institutions.” International and
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content contained within such briefs. These relatively lax rules posed both benefits and
challenges: for example, the courts could be privy to any number of relevant facts and
information to the case at hand, but at the same time, there was no way to tell whether
one was truly an impartial bystander or a “friend of the party” disguised as a friend of the
court.
In the early years, amicus briefs were often written by lawyers (although not always)
in order to offer information about the law, a court error, a death within a party, or the
existence of any other proceedings.106 One of the most important benefits of these amicus
briefs is that they allowed other affected parties the ability to speak in a case, even if they
were not one of the main two parties. The amicus brief became a way to rectify some of
the shortcomings of the adversarial system.107 For example, a friend of the court could
bring  attention  to  collusive  suits  and  point  out  fraudulent  proceedings  in  one  of  the
principal  parties.108 Amicus briefs  allowed all  relevant  parties  to  have  a  voice  in  the
proceedings, even if they might not be directly related to one of the adversaries in the
court  case itself.  In addition,  many bystanders are able to understand more about the
proceedings than the Courts and identify conflicts of interest that might not be readily
available to the judges.
However, the lack of restrictions on amicus briefs—particularly the qualifications for
the parties who wished to submit one—slowly made it possible for filers to shift their
focus from the disclosure of relevant and neutral information to advocacy. For interested
parties  in  certain  litigation,  the  ability  to  submit  an  amicus  brief  was  not  a  sign  of
106 Anderson, Helen A. “Frenemies of the Court: The Many Faces of Amicus Curiae.” University of 
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detached interest but rather a symptom of their intense concern over the outcome of the
proceedings: “While the courts continued to cling to the proposition that the amicus was a
detached servant of the court … the very notion of his acting for no one was belied by his
rising to do just the opposite—in many instances to act directly and officially as counsel
for one not formally a party to the case.”109 Simply because the interest group submitting
the brief was not directly involved in the case, that did not mean that they were objective.
Many groups submit amicus briefs precisely because they are invested in the outcome of
the case, and they wish to advocate for their preferred outcome.
In  the  early  years  of  the  United  States,  friends  of  the  court  gradually  began  to
represent  public  or  governmental  interests  in  private  disputes.110 The  Supreme Court
ensured that state and federal governments could submit amicus briefs when the case
involved their legitimate interests.111 In a precedent set by Henry Clay in an 1821 case
involving land holdings,  the Supreme Court accepted the practice of federal and state
governments  to  submit  amicus  briefs  in  certain  cases—especially  in  cases  involving
grants of land or other governmental interests.112
As  the  Court  continued  to  evolve,  it  expanded  the  right  of  private  groups  and
individuals to participate in litigation.113 The Court acknowledged the fact that there were
far more interests involved in the outcome of a particular case than those of the two
parties to the suit. Consequently, the Court allowed these third parties to participate in the
proceedings as intervenors or amicus  curiae,  depending on the circumstances and the
109 Ibid, p. 697.
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requests  of the litigants.114 In the nineteenth century,  third-party interests  voiced their
concerns  to  the  Court  far  more  frequently than  ever  before.  115 The  problems of  the
adversary system created the kind of  atmosphere where amicus  briefs  could flourish.
Without these documents, third parties would not be able to reveal relevant facts to the
court  or otherwise have an impact in the case at all, even if the case had dealings far
beyond  the  two  parties.  Most  cases  do  not  exist  in  a  vacuum;  they  have  distinct
consequences that reverberate out to various other interested parties. Amicus briefs allow
those interests to be heard in a way the adversarial system does not. These briefs function
as  “a  catch-all  device”  for  remedying  many  of  the  problems  of  an  adversarial
proceeding.116 It is rare that court cases—especially cases that make it all the way up to
the Supreme Court—only impact  the two parties involved.  It  is  therefore natural  and
expected that there should be some way for other parties to contribute to the case.
As  interested  individuals  and  groups  began  to  contribute  to  the  legal  dialogue
surrounding certain cases more frequently, the function of the amicus briefs drastically
changed.  Private  organizations  began to appear  in  amicus briefs,  not  as  professionals
giving unbiased and neutral information, but as advocates supporting the claims of one of
the parties to the suit.117 Throughout the 19th century, starting with Henry Clay's amicus
brief in 1821, the amicus brief was increasingly used as a way for private interests to air
out their concerns and provide relevant information to the courts in order to advocate for
a particular outcome. By the 1930s, it became “commonplace” for an amicus brief to be
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associated  with  an  organization  or  individual.118 When  an  interest  group  chooses  to
participate  through  an  amicus  brief,  these  documents  are  not  “neutral,  amorphous
embodiment[s] of justice,” but rather an active tool used within the larger interest group
struggle.119 Filing  an  amicus  brief  then  becomes  another  form  of  lobbying  political
institutions for their own preferred outcomes. The third parties most interested by the
case would present information that would help clarify the stakes of the issue and provide
context for the potential significance and consequences of a specific Court decision—all
in the service of their own particular interests. 
One of the most dramatic examples of this shift from neutrality to advocacy is the
creation of the Brandeis brief, or an amicus brief that presented non-legal information to
the Court in an effort to impact the Court's final decision.120 The “pioneer brief” emerged
as part of the proceedings within a Supreme Court case, Muller v. Oregon. This case dealt
with a challenge to a state law restricting the number of hours women were allowed to
work. Louis Brandeis, future Supreme Court justice from 1916 to 1939, submitted a brief
containing only two pages of legal argument and 102 pages of evidence about the specific
harms presented to women by working long hours.121 Even though the science behind the
brief was eventually debunked, the submission of this brief represented a dramatic shift
from the logic-based legal proceedings to an approach that highlighted the importance of
social science and other forms of knowledge. Many interested individuals and groups
soon discovered that they did not have to rely on conventional legal methods to make
their  case.  Instead,  they  could  rely  on  science,  philosophy,  psychology  and  other
118 Krislov, p. 703.
119 Ibid.
120 Larson, p. 1770.
121 Ibid.
43
disciplinary studies to make their case. Many interested parties—of most relevance to the
present study are health organizations and other non-profit advocacy groups—were able
to play to their strengths and submit information directly from their field of study, rather
than fiddling with legal jargon. As this new precedent for briefs took root, the number of
amicus briefs submitted in each case rapidly increased.
Many consequences emerged from this transformation of the amicus brief from a
neutral document to an advocacy document. Perhaps the most salient consequence deals
with “the change in tactics and structure of interest articulation in American politics” that
occurred at the end of the 19th century.122 Interest articulation orginally occurred through
face-to-face interaction with personal contacts. As amicus briefs proliferated and other
forms of interest articulation emerged, interest groups shifted to a more bureaucratic style
of activity.123 “[B]ureaucratically sophisticated groups” are far more likely to advance
their own viewpoints in the Court about many issues, including desegregation, female
labor, civil rights, and same-sex marriage. Influential bureaucratic interest groups possess
numerous advantages, including the ability to mobilize resources and respond quickly
and flexibly to issues before policy is set.124 In the context of any political decision, these
qualities are essential. All three branches of the government—legislative, executive, and
judicial—are responsive to the efforts of interest groups, especially when they are highly
organized. The amicus brief is merely the means through which these interest groups can
support their cause in front of the Supreme Court. 
The continued use of the amicus brief has led to a restructuring of the traditional
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structure of the courts.125 Before the rise of the amicus brief, the system was primarily
adversarial, with the two contesting parties warring for their own victory within the Court
system.126 The presence of  amicus briefs represents the growing understanding that there
are multiple parties who are able to supply information and provide arguments to the
Court in support of a particular outcome.127 Amicus briefs are fundamentally a kind of
lobbying of the Supreme Court.  More than that,  the submission of a  brief can be an
effective way for interest groups to attempt influence within the Court system.128 When
interest groups are taking stock of their ability to impact the Court's decision, amicus
briefs are easily accessible and affordable as a way for many interest groups to push their
own agenda. 
The shift  of  the  amicus  brief  “from neutrality to  partisanship,  from friendship  to
advocacy” has consequently transformed not only the role of the amicus brief but the
judicial  system  at  large.129 One  of  the  most  significant  trends  following  this
transformation has been the monumental rise in amicus curiae participation over the last
several decades. In the 1980s, a study concluded that amicus briefs have been filed in
more than half of all noncommercial cases.130 No evidence has emerged to suggest that
the number of amicus curiae participation has decreased.131 In fact, Obergefell v. Hodges,
with 169 briefs submitted,  indicates that the trend has continued. One reason for this
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trend is the fact that the Supreme Court imposes few restrictions on the participation of
interest groups as amicus curiae. Provided that they get permission from the party and/or
the Supreme Court, anyone can submit an amicus brief, including government agencies,
law professors, interest groups, and high school students.132
Amicus briefs can be categorized according to the relationship between the court and
the  interested  groups.133 There  are  five  major  types  of  interested  parties  who submit
amicus briefs: appointed lawyers; groups or individuals invited by the Court; advocates
of a party; independents in support of neither party; and stakeholders who barely missed
qualifying as direct intervenors.134 These five types are colloquially known as “Court's
Lawyer,” the “Invited Friend,” the “Friend of the Party,” the “Independent Friend,” and
the “Near Intervenor.”135 The decision of these interest groups to participate as amicus
brief can have many root causes, depending on one's relationship to the Courts and to the
parties at issue. Most of the groups mentioned above have a stake in the issue, even if
they intend merely to maintain proper relationship with the Court by providing relevant
information, as in the case of the “Court's Lawyer.” Each of these participants construct
their briefs differently, including different sets of facts and relevant information. As a
result, their effectiveness in the ultimate decision of the Court varies significantly.
For example, governmental briefs are often submitted following the request of the
Supreme Court. In the vast majority of cases, the attorney general or solicitor general
represents the position of the government, but that role may occasionally be filled by the
132 Anderson, p. 362.
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corresponding chief executive.136 These amici curiae were requested to participate by the
court  itself  and therefore function  as  champions of  the  court's  legal  perspective  in  a
particular  issue.137 The  attorney general  also occasionally submits  a  brief  without  the
permission from either of the parties or the Supreme Court itself. As the government's
premiere litigator before the Court, the solicitor general is one of the most successful—
and frequent—filers of amicus briefs.138 The Solicitor General informs the decision of the
government to litigate, the outcome of the litigation, and the allocation of legal resources.
This  office  possesses  “a  special  relationship  with  the  Supreme  Court”  as  a  “Tenth
Justice.”139 The office of Solicitor General generally holds all the advantages of being a
“repeat player” to the court, including an unusually high percentage of wins as petitioners
seeking certiorari and on the merits. Part of this success is due to the office's careful
screening of viable cases and the refusal to bring nonviable cases.140 More than any other
interest  group  or  organization  submitting  amicus  briefs  to  the  Supreme  Court,  the
solicitor  general,  due to its  special,  repeat  relationship to  the Court,  enjoys  particular
amounts of success. 
The second role fulfilled by amici curiae is that of the court's lawyer, or the court's
own advocate of a certain position.141 Second only to the solicitor general, this office has
the best relationship with the Court. Unlike the solicitor general, however, the lawyer is
generally asked to represent a particular position, rendering said lawyer “highly partisan,”
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not disinterested.142 This  amici  role is problematic because it suggests that the court is
stepping out of its role as “neutral arbiter” and actively promoting a particular position,
when the court has historically been understood as “above” such partisanship.143 On the
other hand, the “court's lawyer” can be a vehicle through which it is possible to express
some arguments that the Court is considering as valid, but the parties are not making.144
In this way, these types of briefs emphasize differing arguments that may or may not
seem compelling to the Court; the Justices may simply want to hear more of one side of
the argument or another. There is no conclusive evidence regarding the effectiveness (or
lack thereof) of these types of briefs. However, these briefs potentially have some role to
play in the Court's ultimate decision, especially if they are asked to supply their opinion
during the writ of certiorari stage.145 The same could be said for the “invited friend,” an
individual, group, or institutional actor invited to offer its own opinion on a case.146 Since
the “invited friend” is specifically asked to contribute its own perspective on an issue by
the Court itself, those who fit into this role could potentially be more likely to provide
relevant information and impact the Court's final decision.147
Another  role  of  amicus  curiae  is  that  of  the  “independent  friend”  who  supports
neither party.148 These “independent friends” may or may not be truly independent; they
might  decide  to  contribute  their  opinion  because  the  issue  is  important  to  them  as
individuals or influences their membership within a certain group.  It is rare for an amicus
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to file without somewhat supporting one party or another. For instance, in the case of
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, there were only two neutral amicus briefs filed, compared to 84
total.149 The rare presence of this kind of amicus brief only serves to highlight the fact that
amicus briefs are most commonly used to advocate for one side or another.
The last two roles of amici curiae—the friend of a party, and the near intervenor—are
fulfilled  by  interested  groups,  organizations  and  individuals  who  file  their  briefs
independent of any invitation by the Court. Organized interests have many options for
participation, including the creation of test cases and the sponsorship of other litigation.150
By far, the most prevalent method of interest  group involvement is the amicus brief—in
particular, the brief submitted by a Friend of a Party.151 These briefs are made on behalf of
a certain interest group because the issue is related to its mission or purpose.152 The use of
amicus  briefs  to  advocate  for  a  particular  party has  become so  ubiquitous  that  these
Friend of the Party briefs are now considered “prototypical.”153 The near intervenors are a
step up from the Friend of the Party briefs. These near intervenors are far more likely to
be affected by an outcome of a particular case than the Friend of the Party,  but their
interest  still  is  not  sufficient  cause  for  direct  intervention.”154 In  both  cases,  interest
groups and organizations decide to file a brief because they recognize that the issue at
stake poses unique consequences to their cause, whether positive or negative. Briefs are
submitted in an attempt to sway the Court into seeing their point of view and deciding in
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favor of their cause.
However,  the  effectiveness  of  these  briefs  in  final  Supreme  Court  decisions  is
inconclusive  at  best.  The  existing  research  indicates  that  amicus  briefs  are  relatively
successful at the certiorari stage, but significantly less so at the merits stage.155 Amicus
briefs have historically been a significant factor in the Court's decision to grant or deny
writs  of  certiorari.156 One reason for  this  substantial  influence  is  that  Supreme Court
justices  often  attempt  to  select  cases  with the  “greatest  potential  social,  economic or
political significance.”157 When interested groups submit amicus briefs at the certiorari
stage,  justices  gain a  more nuanced understanding of  the significance of  a  particular
case.158 In addition,  organized interests communicate significant information about the
number of parties at play in the organization, as well as potentially significant forces that
would  influence  their  decision.159 By  giving  voice  to  these  various  concerns,  and
presenting them to the Court in a relatively cost-efficient way,  these briefs provide a
large-scale  picture  of  the  forces  at  work  in  a  particular  case.  Regardless  of  the  side
supported most by the amicus briefs, the mere fact that the documents were submitted at
the certiorari stage indicates that there are a wide range of issues and concerns involved
in the case. Amicus briefs, in this respect, do the work in determining which cases are
worthy of the Court's attention by their mere presence alone. 
However, the influence of amicus briefs on the actual outcome of cases is far murkier.
First, interest groups are highly selective in the cases in which they involve themselves.
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They pay close attention to the environment of the Supreme Court. In most cases, interest
groups  will  only submit  a  brief  if  they  believe  that  the  Court  has  use  of  their  own
particular knowledge about a certain aspect of the case. Most interest groups follow a
distinct set of criteria in deciding whether to submit a brief: 1) There are high stakes
involved, 2) the Justices seem to have little information about the case, and 3) interest
groups are unsure about the final outcome.160 When these conditions are met, organized
interests will more often than not submit a brief. By being so selective in the cases in
which they submit a brief, then, interest groups might “stack” their chances of having an
impact on the eventual outcome.
Second, even if these criteria are met, that does not mean that Supreme Court
justices are so easily swayed by the opinions of non-legal sources. Some argue that the
briefs can often be a source of background information that has not been supplied by the
parties.161 Since amicus briefs are frequently cited in the Justices' opinions, these briefs
can occasionally be helpful. However, these citations present the classic chicken-and-egg
situation: Is the amicus brief influencing the actual decision of the Justices, or are the
Justices merely cherry-picking content from amicus briefs to support their  preexisting
opinions? No consensus has yet emerged on that question. Many also argue that amicus
briefs are unhelpful to the justices because they exemplify nothing more than a chorus of
“me too”s with arguments that do no little to change the justices' minds. At the same time,
some evidence suggests that amicus briefs are a source of far more original information
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than the party briefs themselves.162 If this evidence holds up, then amicus briefs could in
fact provide relevant information to the Court that would lead to their preferred outcome.
However, the evidence is far from conclusive and requires more investigation.
With this  shift  from neutrality to  advocacy,  not  only is  the effectiveness  of  these
amicus briefs called into question but their accuracy as well. In cases dealing with social
issues, such as abortion and gay marriage, it can be all too easy for advocacy groups to
present their data in its most positive iteration. From the submission of the Brandeis brief
to the present day, amicus briefs have presented social science evidence to the Courts.
The use of social  science in particular  is  not  called into question,  since many issues
require the use of social science to adequately judge the impact of a particular decision.
There  are  a  number  of  ways  in  which  social  science  research  might  influence  court
discussions: “At one end of the continuum, researchers take no active role in directly
communicating their research results to the judiciary—research findings are published,
usually in scientific journals, and may find their way into legal decisions if judges cite
them as secondary sources for their opinions.”163 Certain evidence from social science has
so permeated our culture, in other words, that it is commonly accepted as fact without
any major controversies. This type of information is so universally accepted in society
that judges consider them as truth.164 However, on the other end of the spectrum, judges
first  encounter  certain  research  through  briefs.165 This  kind  of  information  requires
individuals  and  organizations  to  actively  participate  in  the  dissemination  of  this
162 Collins Jr, Paul M., Pamela C. Corley, and Jesse Hammer. “Me too: An Investigation of Repetition in 
US Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Briefs.” Judicature 97 (2013): 10.
163 Roesch, Ronald, Stephen L. Golding, Valerie P. Hans, and N. Dickon Reppucci. “Social science and the
courts: The role of amicus curiae briefs.” Law and Human Behavior 15, no. 1 (1991): 2.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
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information. For judges, there is no simple way to know whether these “findings” are
scientifically viable or whether the data is being represented properly.166
The Supreme Court requires a viable method to discern the accuracy of social science
embedded within amicus briefs.167 Given that social and scientific data is often presented
in an effort to persuade, not inform the Court, amicus briefs can easily distort or omit any
social science that does not perfectly fit with their viewpoints.168 Especially within the
context of “social” issues—same-sex marriage is a particularly salient example—many
organized interests filing on behalf of petitioners and respondents could easily include
social science that supports their viewpoint and omit any findings from organizations that
do not share their perspective.169 Prominent organizations often use studies funded by
their  organizations,  which  have  a  particular  bias  built  into  the  process  from  the
beginning.170 Supreme Court  justices—or  their  clerks,  for  that  matter—will  often  not
have the time to fact-check every single fact listed in an amicus brief, it is entirely too
possible for the Supreme Court to be misled when it comes to questions of fact and social
science. Such is only one major problem with this new form of advocacy amicus brief.
Last, and perhaps most important, the submission of an amicus brief, and the content
contained therein, can provide important information about interest groups themselves. In
a study of the amicus briefs submitted in  Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the
content of the briefs reflected the nature of their constituencies, their legal strategies and
166 Ibid.
167 Rustad, Michael, and Thomas Koenig. “Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion 
in Amicus Briefs, The.” NCL Rev. 72 (1993).
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
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core values.171 Organized interests effectively use the amicus brief as a way to articulate
their  own  interests,  which  adds  stability  to  political  systems.172 Interest  groups  also
submit amicus briefs not only to influence the Supreme Court, but to publicize their core
and  maintain  their  organization.173 Ultimately,  amicus  briefs  provide  a  wealth  of
information  about  the  structure  of  interest  groups,  their  motivations,  and their  larger
influence within society.
In  the  present  study  of  a  sample  of  Obergefell  v.  Hodges amicus  briefs,  these
documents become a window into the minds of certain interest groups, illuminating the
ways in which they construct their arguments and advocate for a certain cause. Amicus
briefs, in a general sense, are already polarized documents, because they are attempting to
persuade the court to take a specific legal action. However, this present study will use the
amicus  briefs  as  a  way  to  illuminate  the  underlying  arguments  that  undergird  this
preexisting  polarization.  In  this  way,  amicus  briefs  are  not  the  cause,  nor  the  sole
contributor, to the polarization, but they are a symptom of the polarization. By exploring
the content contained within these amicus briefs, this present study will attempt to reveal
some of the hinges on which the controversy rests.
171 Behuniak-Long, Susan. “Friendly Fire: Amici Curiae and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.” 
Judicature 74 (1990): 270.
172 Caldeira and Wright, p. 1123.
173 Songer, Donald R., and Reginald S. Sheehan. “Interest group success in the courts: Amicus 
participation in the Supreme Court.” Political Research Quarterly 46, no. 2 (1993): 340.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Methodology
A qualitative content analysis was conducted with a select sample of amicus briefs
from the recent Supreme Court decision about same-sex marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges.
The purpose of this study was to examine: 1) the manner in which both sides frame and
discuss  the  issue  of  same-sex  marriage;  and  2)  the  points  of  commonality  and
polarization  within  this  discussion.  By  pinpointing  some  of  the  major  sources  of
commonality—the points at which both sides both present a common understanding—
and contention—the points at which both sides fundamentally disagree—we can gain a
better understanding of the underlying beliefs and values that underlie the cases made by
interest groups and individuals on both sides of the issue. The content analysis was not
meant to describe the causes of polarization, but rather to explore how that polarization is
expressed within the briefs. In turn, this improved understanding of the arguments most
commonly used by both sides can be used to speculate further about the history of this
divisive issue within the country after Obergefell's legalization of same-sex marriage.
In the field of social science, content analysis is “a research method that uses a set of
procedures to make valid inferences about the text.”174 The context of a particular text can
reveal key facts about the producer of a text, the message of the text, or the audience of
the text.175 Content analysis can also summarize the behaviors of political actors and the
relationships  between  them.176 As  long  as  the  researcher  has  access  to  relevant
information in the form of a physical record,  such as books,  magazines,  newspapers,
174 Weber, Robert Phillip. Basic content analysis, No. 49. Sage, 1990: 9
175 Ibid.
176 Manheim, Jarol B., Richard C. Rich, Lars Willnat, and Craig Leonard Brians. Empirical political 
analysis: quantitative and qualitative research methods. Longman Pub Group, 2008: 161.
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photographs, Web pages, or legal documents, among many others, the researcher can use
the text itself to “answer research questions” and make “empirical observations.”177 For
example, in the context of the present study, the content to be analyzed is a select sample
of amicus briefs from Obergefell v. Hodges, which can then be extrapolated out to reveal
important facets of interest group politics and the larger social context surrounding the
issue of same-sex marriage.  These briefs  can illuminate some of  the key beliefs  and
arguments that  divide both sides  of  the argument,  and content  analysis  is  merely the
method through which those details are illuminated.
Content analyses are used for many purposes. Most relevant to this current study is
this  research  method's  ability  to  “reflect  cultural  patterns  of  groups,  institutions  or
societies;  reveal the focus of individual,  group, institutional, or societal  attention; and
describe  trends  in  communication  content.”178 A content  analysis  of  amicus  briefs,
submitted by relevant interest groups, will be most likely to reveal certain patterns in
thinking and argumentation used by both sides, whether in agreement or opposition to
one another. These briefs provide an easily accessible way to see what matters to both
sides of the issue. Both the petitioners and the respondents clearly have differing attitudes
toward the issue of same-sex marriage, but the actual reasons, the legitimate arguments,
supporting that polarization have not been explored adequately within the legal context.
Given the stake interest groups have in the issue, and their decision to submit an amicus
brief  to  support  that  perspective,  these  amicus  briefs  provide  a  way  to  see  certain
persuasive arguments used by both sides. 
177 Johnson, Janet Buttolph, Henry T. Reynolds, and Jason D. Mycoff. Political science research methods.
Cq Press, 2015: 206.
178 Weber, p. 9.
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Although  there  are  some  limitations  to  the  study,  given  that  amicus  briefs  are
primarily  a  legal  document,  these  texts  still  provide  a  way  to  “describe  trends  in
communication  content”  and  “reveal  the  focus  of  individual,  group,  institutional  or
societal attention.”179 If certain arguments show up time and time again across briefs by
one party, or if both sides mention the same issues in differing degrees with different
rhetoric, then one can infer that these arguments are considered particularly relevant to
the discussion over same-sex marriage or that they are considered particularly persuasive
to the Court itself. In addition, if both sides present the same basic issue in a drastically
different light, this division could elucidate the polarization existing in larger society. Not
all of the arguments—for example, the ones made exclusively from legal principles like
precedent—will  be relevant  to  a  study of the larger  interest  group politics,  but  other
arguments, such as those from moral principle or future consequences, could help explain
why the two sides have found it so difficult to agree on this issue.
The  first  step  in  performing  any  content  analysis  is  to  define  the  content  to  be
studied.180 In the present study, a sample of  Obergefell v. Hodges' amicus briefs will be
analyzed. In this Supreme Court decision, 149 amicus briefs were submitted, 77 in favor
of Petitioners and 67 in favor of the Respondents. Five of the amicus briefs were filed in
support of neither party. On the official Supreme Court website, a list of all amicus briefs
was provided.  The list  was compiled  in  order  of  Petitioners,  neutral  briefs,  and then
Respondents. From this list, I selected every fifth brief for inclusion in my study. This
selection process yielded 14 briefs from both the petitioners and the respondents, along
179 Ibid, p. 9.
180 Manheim, p. 162.
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with one amicus brief in support of neither party. The sample size for this study was 29
briefs.
Once  the  sample  size  has  been  selected,  the  next  step  is  to  decide  on  a  unit  of
analysis, or “the particular element or characteristic of a given communication that we
shall examine, count or assess.”181 In this study, the unit of analysis was the theme, “a
particular  combination  of  words  or  ideas,  such  as  a  phrase,  a  sentence,  or  even  a
paragraph.”182 When coding for a theme within a content analysis, it is essentially a code
for  “recurring  subjects  in  a  text.”183 Each  amicus  brief  was  coded  according  to  the
arguments used to either support or oppose the legalization of same-sex marriage. When
a consistent theme of argumentation—for example, the right to same-sex marriage or the
harms accrued to same-sex couples from denying them the freedom to marry—appears, it
was highlighted in blue or green. Blue was used to designate arguments in favor of same-
sex  marriage,  green  for  arguments  against  same-sex  marriage.  Once  these  arguments
were coded,  each of the briefs  was read through once again to  compile  a  list  of  the
arguments used within the briefs.
This process was not straightforward, because numerous problems arise when coding
for themes, not words or phrases, within a particular text. One of the major problems with
coding for theme is that it makes the context of a particular statement clear, but there is a
lack of a certain degree of complexity.184 For example, if one was coding for the single
word “rights” contained within a sample amicus brief, there are many contexts in which
that  word  could  appear  that  might  not  have  any  bearing  on  the  issue  of  same-sex
181 Ibid, p. 163.
182 Ibid, p. 164.
183 Ibid.
184Ibid.
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marriage. The same could go for the word “harm,” which could be used independent of
any relevance to the current study. Searching for themes is a broad brush; it enables the
discovery of certain arguments,  but it  does not explore the nuances of the arguments
made within the amicus briefs. In order to supply more subtle differences, it is paramount
to use a thinner brush. 
However,  for  the  purposes  of  providing  a  broad  overview  of  the  persuasive
techniques and strategies used in representing certain arguments,  this  thicker brush is
appropriate. In the context of this study, using the theme as the unit of analysis is meant
to pinpoint some of the core arguments that both sides use to bolster their cause. Certain
questions  were  asked over  the  course  of  the  study,  such  as:  What  common lines  of
argument appear  over  and over  again within the briefs?  When people  talk  about  the
legalization of gay marriage, what do they consider the most important issues in deciding
the question? How do they frame their arguments? By exploring themes, the answers to
this questions hopefully become clearer. To illustrate, certain groups might phrase the
issue of same-sex marriage as a fundamentally rights-based issue, which puts them in
direct conflict with certain groups who might frame the issue in terms of a redefinition of
marriage. Exploring the most common themes within each brief allows a larger picture of
the conflict to develop, including which arguments and issues are most commonly raised
by both sides.
Identifying  the  categories  representing  within  the  briefs  posed  challenges.  Many
sections within an amicus brief contained phrases and sentences that could be coded in
different ways.  One might refer to the right of same-sex couples to marry,  but in the
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context of the harms provided to same-sex couples if said right was denied. In that case,
should the section be categorized as a rights-based argument or a harms-based argument?
There are no clear answers to this question. Paragraphs and complete texts are naturally
more difficult to code as a monolithic unit, because paragraphs typically contain far more
information and a+9 greater diversity in topics.185 When confronted with this challenge, it
was sometimes necessary to break up paragraphs into sentences and even phrases and
code them separately, even if they occurred in proximity with one another. In the case of
the rights-based argument and the harms-based argument, for example, a sentence like
“The  right  of  same-sex  couples  should  not  be  denied  because  such  a  denial  would
negatively impact the well-being of same-sex couples” would be coded as both a rights-
based argument and a harms-based argument. If the sentence was to be broken up further,
of course, the first part would be classified as a rights-based argument and the second part
an argument from potential harms.
Once each brief had been coded for preliminary arguments, they were read through
once again to provide a complete list of the most-commonly used arguments and themes.
Each brief was given a designation—for example,  A1 for the first  petitioners'  amicus
brief, B2 for the first respondents' brief, and AB1 for the neutral party's brief—and then
included in a table.  This table included the brief designation,  along with a list of the
commonly-used arguments. Within the table, if an argument appeared, it was designated
in  the  appropriate  box with  a  X.  After  the  creation  of  the  graph,  a  list  of  the  most
commonly used arguments from both parties was compiled and then compared against
each  other  to  see  what  major  sources  of  contention—the  hinges  of  the  argument—
185 Weber, p. 16.
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emerged. In other words, if certain arguments appeared to be used by both sides, it was
noted accordingly. Once this list of common arguments was created, another reading of
the amicus briefs was conducted to outline the differing ways in which both sides framed
their arguments. For instance, if both sides talked about the issue of redefining marriage,
the briefs were reread to see how they talked about the issue and to identify the ways in
which  they either  concur  with  each  other  or  disagree  across  both  the  petitioner  and
respondent amicus briefs.
What this analysis of these arguments theoretically allows for is a study for how the
two sides are polarized on this issue of same-sex marriage. The very existence of the
amicus briefs is a symptom of the fact that this topic is incredibly divisive, with both
sides contributing almost equal numbers of briefs to support their diametrically opposed
views  on the  issue.  However,  what  remains  a  mystery is  how they are  polarized.  In
performing the study, certain questions emerged: Are the two sides polarized because
they are talking about two completely different things when they talk about same-sex
marriage, or are they polarized because they are speaking about fundamentally the same
issues but in oppositional ways? In essence, are the two sides talking past each other or
are  they  butting  heads  about  certain  important  philosophical,  legal,  and  religious
questions about religion, marriage, and among others? If there are certain areas on which
they agree, why might they agree? What accounts for the major sources of concurrence or
dissension within certain arguments, say, about the right to marry or the redefinition of
marriage? This study hoped to be able to answer some of those questions, if only in a
very preliminary way, by analyzing the common arguments used by both sides
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CHAPTER FIVE
Findings
An initial analysis of the interest groups represented in the selected sample revealed
several key characteristics of those interested groups and individuals who chose to submit
said briefs on behalf of either party. On the side of the petitioners, 11 out of the 14 briefs
were filed by interest groups. A vast number of interest groups were represented, from
organizations of legal scholars (Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, Conflict of
Laws and Family Laws Professors, Family Law Scholars) to medical and psychological
organizations  (American  Psychological  Association),  along with  general  social  justice
groups  (NAACP and  The  Alliance  State  Advocates  for  Women's  Rights  and  Gender
Equality) and LGBT advocacy groups (PFLAG, Equality Ohio, etc.). One brief was filed
by an individual,  Kenneth B. Mehlman; one by a group of individual plaintiffs  from
Alabama and other states with marriage bans,  united only for the express purpose of
filing from Alabama and other states with marriage bans; and the last by the state of
Massachusetts. On the side of the respondents, however, a larger proportion of the briefs
—about 6 out of 14—were filed by individuals. The remaining 8 were filed on behalf of
organizations. Although the status of the interested parties in the sample might not be
representative of the total number of amicus briefs filed in  Obergefell v. Hodges, these
differences should be taken into account when exploring the arguments contained within
the briefs.
The status of the filers  affects  the structure of the briefs themselves.  Each of the
briefs, on their face, fit into the prototypical structure of an amicus brief, containing the
following sections: interest of amici, statement and summary of argument, argument, and
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a conclusion (possibly an appendix if deemed necessary). Looking deeper, there is far
greater variation in the structural components of the amicus briefs. Most of the briefs
support their arguments in a rather impartial and objective style. Their primary method of
argumentation is legal rhetoric, relying on standards of precedent and understanding of
the law to support their arguments. Other briefs deviate sharply from this norm, however,
using personal experience, philosophy, social science, religion, and medicine to support
their position on gay marriage.
One primary finding is that, while both sides contain briefs utilizing unconventional
structures  for  their  briefs  and  non-legal  arguments,  the  respondents  contain  these
unconventional structures and arguments to a greater extent. That does not mean that the
petitioners do not have some obvious deviations as well. For example, one of the most
obvious  deviations  from  the  traditional  legal  brief  structure  by  the  petitioners  was
PFLAG's  amicus  brief,  which  contained primarily personal  stories  from families  and
friends of LGBT couples. This brief explicitly stated that they “offer[s] personal stories”
revealing  that  “there  is  no risk  to  marriages  of  opposite-sex  couples  merely because
same-sex couples also commit to marriage, and that barring same-sex couples from the
commitment of marriage humiliates the children of those couples” and that “prohibiting
committed same-sex couples from marrying relegates their relationships to an inferior
status.”186 No other brief in support of the petitioners used personal experiences as the
primary means of supporting their argument. 
On the other hand, many of the briefs submitted by the petitioners displayed a sharper
186 Brief for PFLAG Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ 
(2015).
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deviation  from  the  existing  legal  norm  regarding  amicus  briefs.  These  deviations
occurred  most  often  in  the  briefs  of  individual  respondents,  like  the  brief  of  Dawn
Stefanowicz  and  Denise  Shick.  In  this  brief,  Stefanowicz  and Shick  wrote  that  their
“interest is due to [their] diverse personal, professional, or social experiences with our
fathers,  their  same-sex  sexual  partners  and  associated  gay,  lesbian,  bisexual  and
transsexual subcultures during the first 30 years of our lives.”187 Another specified their
own personal connection and investment in the case, which triggered concern for the
larger implications of the legalization of same-sex marriage. The filer of this brief, Jon
Simmons, identified his position as a member of a community concerned for the well-
being of society after the legalization of same-sex marriage.188 Another individual amici
used their  status as a  pastor  to present  important information regarding the nature of
marriage  and  its  connection  to  religious  doctrine.189 Their  personal  experiences  thus
became an important underpinning to their decision to submit a brief and present their
arguments to the Court, and the structure of the briefs represented this fact. Each of the
briefs mentioned above integrated their own personal experience into the text itself in a
way that was rare to be seen in the petitioners' briefs.
Setting  aside  these  structural  concerns,  several  discrete  themes  of  argumentation
emerged from the content analysis. Both the petitioners and the respondents used certain
arguments to support their claims for or against same-sex marriage. The two tables, listed
below, reveal the major arguments of the petitioners and the respondents. 
187 Brief for Dawn Stefanowicz and Denise Shick As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
188 Brief for Jon Simmons as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___
(2015).
189 Brief for Rev. John T. Rankin as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 
U.S. ___ (2015).
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Table 1: Petitioners' Arguments
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 
Traditional 
conservative 
values
X
Rights-based 
arguments
X X X X X X X X X X
Harms to LGBT 
community
X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Harms to 
heterosexual 
community and 
society
X X X X
Harms to 
institution of 
marriage
X X X
Benefits to 
institution of 
marriage
X X X
Benefits to 
families, children 
and society
X X X X X X X
Religious 
arguments
X X X
“Who decides” - 
courts v. 
legislatures
X X X X X X
Definition/value 
of marriage
X X X X X X
Role/interest of 
government 
(state/federal)
X X X X X X X X
Tradition X X X X X X
Domestic 
partnerships/civil 
unions
X X
Nature of 
homosexuality
X X
Procreation and 
parenting
X X X X X X
Use of precedent X X X
Sex-based 
discrimination
X X X
Polygamy X
1st Amendment X
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Table 2: Respondents' Briefs*
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 AB1
Traditional 
conservative values
X
Rights-based 
arguments
X X X X X X X X X X X X
Harms to LGBT 
community
X X X X X X X X X X
Harms to 
heterosexual 
community and 
society
X X X X X X X X
Harms to 
institution of 
marriage
X X
Benefits to 
institution of 
marriage
Benefits to 
families, children 
and society
X X X X X
Religious 
arguments
X X X X X
“Who decides” - 
courts v. 
legislatures
X X X X X X X X X
Definition/value of 
marriage
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Role/interest of 
government 
(state/federal)
X X X X X X X X X
Tradition X X X X X X X X X X X
Domestic 
partnerships/civil 
unions
X
Nature of 
homosexuality
X X X
Procreation and 
parenting
X X X X X X X X X X X
Use of precedent X X X X X X
Sex-based 
discrimination
X
Polygamy X X X X X X
1st Amendment
*Included in this table is the neutral party's brief, designated by AB1.
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These two tables reveal the major list of arguments that characterize each of the 28
briefs in the sample, along with the one neutral brief (which, for the purposes of this
study,  will  be  disregarded).  Most  of  the  arguments  listed  above  occur  in  both  the
petitioners' and the respondents' briefs, which indicate that both sides talk about the same
kinds of issues in the context of the larger issue of same-sex marriage. However, the two
sides talk about the issues in different frequencies. For example, the petitioners talked
most  often  about  the  harms to  the  LGBT community,  whereas  the  respondents  were
primarily concerned with the definition and value of marriage.  Some issues appeared
with  the  same frequency across  both  sides.  Occasionally,  either  the  petitioner  or  the
respondent mentioned an argument in passing that appeared more frequently in the other
side's briefs. As I will discuss later in this chapter, even when the briefs are talking about
the same topics, they are talking about it in very different terms.
Certain arguments appeared across briefs that were not anticipated. For example, one
brief from each side used “traditional conservative values” to support their arguments for
and against same-sex marriage. Given the role of conservative politics in the traditional
marriage  movement,  these  results  were  not  necessarily  expected.  In  addition,  some
arguments appeared on one side but did not appear on the other: for example, the benefits
to the institution of marriage. This argument appeared only on the side of the petitioners,
not the respondents. This fact alone reveals that, in many instances, the two sides can talk
past each other, using arguments that the other side rarely, if ever, addresses outright. One
would imagine that, if one side used a certain argument, the other would bring it up just
to refute it, but that was not necessarily the case. 
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Note those times when certain themes and arguments appeared together. Within the
petitioners'  briefs,  for example,  it  was incredibly difficult  to separate the rights-based
arguments from the harms of the LGBT community. Within the respondents' briefs, there
was a great degree of overlap between the briefs that mentioned the definition/value of
marriage and the tradition. The briefs did not present a series of disparate arguments.
They created cohesive arguments that blended together many different themes and topics.
It  would  be  almost  impossible  to  separate  some  of  the  arguments  from each  other,
interconnected as they are. For example, where does one get the definition of marriage?
As will be seen later on, the respondents get their definition of marriage from tradition.
On the side of the petitioners, why is guaranteeing the rights of same-sex couples to
marry so important? It is important precisely because of the harms that would accrue to
the  community if  they were  not  allowed to  marry,  in  particular  the  legitimization  of
discrimination and the prejudice.
For the purposes of this study, I was concerned primarily with the arguments that
appeared  most  often  among  both  the  petitioners'  and  the  respondents'  briefs.  The
following  table  counts  the  number  of  briefs  on  either  side  that  mention  a  particular
argument.  Prior  to  this  analysis,  it  would have  been entirely possible  that  both sides
talked past each other, never addressing the other side's arguments. The petitioners could
have talked only about the rights of same-sex couples to marry, while the respondents
talked only about the redefinition of marriage, for instance. If they never addressed the
arguments of the other side, then there would be little opportunity for clashing, merely
talking over the heads of the other side. However, the data revealed that both sides tended
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to talk the most about the same essential issues with roughly equal proportions. In this
table, the arguments displayed in the neutral party's briefs were disregarded.
Table 3: Dispersion of Arguments Across Petitioners and Respondents
Petitioners Respondents
Traditional conservative values 1 1
Rights-based arguments 10 11
Harms to LGBT community 13 9
Harms  to  heterosexual
community and society
4 8
Harms  to  institution  of
marriage
3 2
Benefits  to  institution  of
marriage
3 0
Benefits  to  families,  children
and society
7 5
Religious-based arguments 3 5
“Who  decides”  –  courts  v.
legislatures
6 9
Definition/value of marriage 6 14
Role/interest  of  government
(state v. federal)
8 8
Tradition 6 10
Domestic  partnerships/civil
unions
2 1
Nature of homosexuality 2 3
Procreation and parenting 6 10
Use of precedent 3 5
Sex-based discrimination 3 1
Polygamy 1 6
1st Amendment 1 0
This table reveals key information about the nature of the legal debate over same-sex
marriage. Certain arguments appeared over and over again across both the petitioners'
and the respondents' briefs. Among the petitioners' briefs, the following list indicates the
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most frequently-used arguments by the petitioners:
Harms to LGBT community
Rights-based arguments
Role/interest of government (state/federal)
Benefits to families, children, and society
“Who decides” – courts v. legislatures
Definition/value of marriage
Tradition
Procreation/parenting
All but one of the briefs mentioned that the LGBT community would be harmed if
they were not allowed to marry the person of their choice. It is significant that 13 of the
interest groups represented by this sample considered this argument of such significance
that they could not help but to mention it; in many cases, it was the foreground of their
argument. The same could be said of the rights-based argument: 10 out of 14 interest
groups represented argued that there was a fundamental right to marry a person of the
same sex that should not be abridged by the government. Eight of ten interest groups
mentioned that it was the role of the federal government, not the states, to decide on this
fundamental decision. Half of the interest groups—seven out of 14—argued that certain
benefits would accrue to families, children, and society through the allowance of same-
sex marriage. 
Within  the  petitioners'  briefs,  certain  arguments  also  occurred  with  the  same
frequency.  The  last  four  arguments—“who  decides,”  definition/value  of  marriage,
tradition,  and  procreation/parenting—appeared  in  6  out  of  the  14  briefs.  A crucial
distinction must be made here: all four of the arguments did not appear in the same six
briefs (see table 1), but the arguments did occur with the same frequency among all 14
briefs.  For  example,  6  briefs  specifically  mentioned  the  “who  decides”  argument  to
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advocate that the courts should decide in favor of same-sex marriage. A different 6 briefs
mentioned that they were not seeking to change the definition of marriage by including
same-sex couples in the institution. These arguments merely appeared the same number
of times across the briefs, but there need not necessarily be overlapping arguments within
said briefs.
Similarly, the respondents talked about the same issues over and over again within
their briefs. The following list of arguments indicates the most commonly-used topics:
Definition/value of marriage
Rights-based arguments
Tradition
Procreation/parenting
Harms to LGBT community
Role/interest of government (state/federal)
“Who decides” – courts v. legislatures
Among the respondents' briefs, there was a smaller list of arguments, but they all
occurred  with  much  greater  frequency.  For  example,  every  single  one  of  the  briefs
mentioned  that  the  question  of  same-sex  marriage  was  fundamentally  a  question
regarding the definition of marriage. In other words, the current controversy was centered
around  two  opposing  views  about  marriage's  definition  and  value.  Much  like  the
petitioners,  eleven  of  the  respondents  brought  up  the  question  of  rights:  Is  there  a
fundamental  right  to  marry?  If  there is,  what  constitutes  that  right?  Should same-sex
couples be given the same right to marry, and if not, why not? Certainly this issue was
important enough to the petitioners and the respondents that they spent about equal time
discussing it within their own briefs.
The  respondents  spent  equal  time  discussing  the  issues  of  tradition  and
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procreation/parenting; 10 of the interest groups mentioned these issues within their briefs.
Again, as in the case of the petitioners' arguments, not all of the 10 briefs mentioning the
issue  were  the  same,  but  there  was  a  certain  degree  of  overlap.  The  respondents
mentioned harms to the LGBT community in 9 out of 14 briefs. They also mentioned the
question of “who decides” in 9 out of 14 briefs, stating that the decision should ultimately
rest  in the hands of the legislatures.  They mentioned the role/interest  of government,
namely the right of the states to decide issues of marriage, in 8 out of the 14 briefs. An
equal number of briefs mentioned the harms that would result to heterosexual families,
children, and society if same-sex couples were allowed to marry. 
What is significant about the data is that the same themes and topics permeated both
the  petitioners'  and  the  respondents'  briefs.  Out  of  the  petitioners'  briefs,  the  only
argument that did not appear to be common in the respondents' briefs was the issue of the
benefits  that would accrue to families, children and society if  same-sex couples were
allowed to marry. Out of the respondents' briefs, the only discordant theme was the harms
that would result to heterosexual families, children and society that would result if same-
sex couples were to  marry.  Interestingly enough,  this  fact  alone displays  an essential
difference about the perceived consequences of legal same-sex marriage. Both operate
from a belief that families and children need to be strengthened in our society, but they
dispute the proper way to achieve this result. The petitioners argue that allowing same-
sex couples to marry will strengthen the family unit in our society, but the respondents
refute  that  claim  and  argue  that  allowing  same-sex  couples  to  marry  will  achieve
precisely the opposite result. This diametrically opposed view of the positive or negative
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consequences of same-sex marriage create a certain degree of tension between the two
parties that seemingly has no potential for a middle ground to develop.
Of note also are those themes that show up in a large proportion in one side's briefs
but are hardly mentioned in the other side's. Excepting the two themes listed above, the
only other argument of this type was the question of polygamy. Another term for this
argument could be the “slippery slope”: The respondents argue that allowing same-sex
marriage would be the first step to allowing all kinds of other “deviant” behavior, like
polygamy,  bestiality,  and  incest  to  enter  into  our  society.  Same-sex  marriage  is
conceptualized as the first step to the moral degradation of our society.
For the sake of space, the rest of this chapter will deal with the top three arguments
used  within  the  petitioners'  and  the  respondents'  amicus  briefs.  The  five  resulting
arguments  to  be  discussed  are  as  follows:  harms  to  LGBT community,  rights-based
arguments, role/interest of government (state v. federal), definition/value of marriage, and
tradition.  In particular,  I examined the briefs for those points when they agree and/or
disagree about the issue. For example, if the context of the rights-based argument, what
animated the discussion about these issues among the briefs? What are the sources of
agreement and disagreement when it  comes to each of these issues? By asking these
questions, I aimed to explore how the two sides talked about these common themes and
discover the extent to which these discussions expressed and contributed to the current
polarized environment surrounding same-sex marriage.
 In addition, I will analyze those arguments with a lopsided distribution: the benefits
v. harms to (heterosexual) families, children and society, and the polygamy, or slippery
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slope, argument. For the purposes of this study, discussing the three most commonly used
arguments  among  both  of  the  briefs  is  sufficient  to  explore  key  aspects  about  the
polarization that exists within our contemporary society regarding this issue.
I will take each of the arguments in turn, except for those times when two separate
themes were so interconnected that it would have been disingenuous and misleading to
separate them. Such occasions are noted in their corresponding sections.
Harms to LGBT community
Petitioners
The petitioners' amici argue that many types of harm result from the denial of same-
sex  couples  to  the  institution  of  marriage.  This  denial  “discourage[s]  responsibility,
fidelity, and commitment” and refuses children access to essential legal protections that
encourage stability and security.  190 Another brief argued that “[h]arm to children lies at
the  heart  of  the  issue.”191  Children  of  LGBT  couples  are  “humiliate[d]”  as  the
relationship of their  parents is given a second-class status.192 To support this position,
many briefs cite the landmark decision of  United States v. Windsor,  which stated that
denying same-sex couples (and their children) access to marriage makes it “'even more
difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and
its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.'”193  Another
190 Brief for Kenneth B. Mehlman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 
U.S. ___ (2015).
191 Brief for Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
192 Brief for PFLAG, Inc.
193 Brief for Ninety-Two Plaintiffs in Marriage Cases in Alabama, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). See also Brief for Constitutional Accountability
Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), Brief for 
PFLAG.
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brief extends this argument: “They [the marriage bans] deprive children of benefits in
order  to  influence  the  behavior  of  others,”  namely,  their  parents.  Marriage  bans
functionally punish children for the supposedly “deviant” behavior of their parents.194 The
harm to the LGBT community extends far beyond the specific couple seeking a marriage
license.
Another key harm to the LGBT community is the imposition of unfair stigma and
discrimination. Many of the petitioners' briefs argue that barring same-sex couples from
marriage demeans the LGBT community by branding them as inferior, which leads to
stigmatization and further discrimination.195 Other briefs explain this harm in more depth:
“In depriving gay men and lesbians of membership in an important social institution,
these laws convey the States' judgments that committed intimate relationships between
people of the same sex are inferior to heterosexual relationships. This is the essence of
stigma.”196 A crucial  distinction is  made within the briefs  that marriage  bans do not
merely exclude same-sex couples from the rights of marriage, but rather, the bans signify
a kind of state-sanctioned disapproval of same-sex couples.197 This codified disapproval
within the laws harm younger members of the LGBT community struggling with their
self-identify. These bans imply that these individuals deserve less simply because they
were born gay. 198 One of the unintended consequences of this ban is the perpetuation of
the  belief  that  same-sex  couples  are  not  capable  of  forming  committed,  long-term
194 Brief for Family Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 
U.S. ___ (2015).
195 Brief for Bay Area Lawyers.
196 Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
197 Brief for Bay Area Lawyers.
198Brief for PFLAG.
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relationships, which is increasingly damaging to the self-conception of many members of
the LGBT community.199
Some of the briefs expand on this argument about stigma and discrimination. They
state that these bans encourage society's hyper-focus on sexual orientation and therefore
legitimize the ways in which regular citizens view members of the LGBT community as
somehow not deserving of “the same respect and dignity” given to everyone else.200 The
fact that same-sex couples are denied access to this institution makes them inherently
unequal to opposite-sex couples, and this “perceived 'differentness'” is enshrined within
the  law.  This  enshrined  differentiation  “tend[s]  to  legitimize  prejudicial  attitudes  and
individual  acts  against  the  disfavored  group,  including  ostracism,  harassment,
discrimination,  and  violence.”201 In  other  words,  by  barring  same-sex  couples  from
marriage,  society  is  normalizing  prejudice  and  discrimination  against  the  LGBT
community as a whole and contributing to acts of violence perpetuated against the group.
This normalization can have unintended health consequences as well, according to
one  of  the  briefs.202 The  stigma  and  stress  imposed  by  such  state-sanctioned
discrimination does not merely lead to feelings of inferiority and the relegation of their
relationship to a second-class status; this discrimination can negatively impact the mental
and physical health of LGBT individuals.203 These discriminatory laws that inflict real
mental and physical harm, therefore, cannot be countenanced.
Lastly, certain briefs mentioned the opposing sides' arguments: “Opponents of same-
199Ibid.
200Brief for Bay Area Lawyers.
201Brief for American Psychological Association.
202Brief for American Public Health Association, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
203Ibid.
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sex marriage often gild their  arguments with the patina of tolerance,  for example,  by
framing  the  issue  in  'definitional'  terms,  but  stigma  and  scorn  lie  just  beneath  the
surface.”204 These  “definitional”  arguments—discussed  later  on  in  this  chapter—are
therefore rendered illegitimate. Many briefs argue that the sole purpose of the marriage
bans  is  “animus”  against  the  LGBT community,  which  is  not  a  legitimate  reason to
continually relegate them to a second-class status.205 The essence of their arguments is
that “anything short of full and equal marriage rights would perpetuate the stigma and
second-tier status that gay and lesbian couples currently experience.”206,207
Respondents
Of the briefs that mentioned harms to the LGBT community, one only mentioned the
argument to refute the petitioners' claims: “opposition to 'same-sex marriage' does not
reflect an animus against same-sex partners.”208 Indirectly, in conjunction with a rights-
based argument (discussed later on in this chapter), one other brief acknowledged the
petitioners'  argument:  “Petitioners  cite  substantial  hardship  as  to  the  loss  of  certain
204 Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
205 Brief for Equality Ohio as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ 
(2015). See also Brief for Conflict of Laws and Family Law Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
206 Brief for Massachusetts, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 
U.S. ___ (2015).
207 The vast majority of the briefs presented their arguments in the way I have laid out above. However, of 
note is the brief submitted by The Alliance State Advocates for Women's Rights and Gender Equality. 
This brief argued that these marriage bans perpetuate a kind of sex-based discrimination that is 
incredibly harmful to the LGBT community: “Bans on marriage of same-sex couples are state-backed 
legal regimes that are based on and reinforce gender stereotypes that harm everyone, including LBT 
people and heterosexual and non-transgender women and men oppressed by imposition of those 
stereotypes. Such bans cannot stand.” Although this argument was not common among the petitioners' 
briefs, it points to a different kind of harm that might result from these marriage bans and therefore it is 
worth mentioning in passing.
208 Brief for American Freedom Law Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
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marital  benefits,  but  no abridgment  of  liberty.”209 Nothing further  was done to  either
support or refute the petitioners' arguments.
The remaining briefs that explicitly brought up the harms argument stand in direct
contrast  to the petitioners'  briefs.  For example,  several briefs brought up the issue of
harms to children. One stated that “a child of a same-sex couple may be stigmatized more
by the unusual appearance of having 'two fathers' or 'two mothers' than by whatever their
legal status happens to be.”210 In this case, there is some degree of concurrence between
the petitioners'  and the respondents'  briefs:  They both acknowledge that  the potential
harms to children of LGBT couples should be taken into account, and these children may
experience stigma based on their parents' sexual orientation, but the respondent disputes
what would cause the greater harm: recognizing or not recognizing the relationship as
legitimate. Essentially, the respondent argues that recognizing same-sex marriages would
not eliminate the stigma present for a child with two same-sex parents.
One of the briefs speaks directly from the perspective of children who grew up in an
LGBT household. Dawn Stefanowicz and Denise Shick argue from their own personal
experience: “It is difficult to be a child of same-sex parents, for reasons including sexual
or gender confusion; forced approval of certain sexual lifestyles; and commodification of
children.”211 Both of these women grew up in an abusive LGBT household and therefore
they are committed to making sure that such children have a voice. The harm to children,
in their view, is far greater if they grow up in a LGBT household than if they grow up
209 Brief for Liberty Scholars and the Thomas More Society of Dallas as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
210 Brief for Lary S. Larson as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.  
___ (2015).
211 Brief for Dawn Stefanowicz and Denise Shick.
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with  their  biological  parents.  They  directly  contradict  the  claims  of  the  petitioners:
“various studies have shown that children of same-sex parents end up worse off than
children of traditional, diverse-gender parents.”212 Another brief substantiated this claim:
“children brought up in homosexual families are much more likely to face serious mental,
physical,  and emotional  challenges.”213 To protect  children,  then,  it  is  paramount  that
same-sex marriage is not allowed.
The remaining briefs argued that homosexuality is inherently harmful to adults as
well.  Allowing same-sex marriage would lead to widespread harms within the LGBT
community. Amici express this argument in several interconnected ways. Citing a certain
Cameron study, the Foundation for Moral Law states that “the homosexual lifestyle is
unhealthy and not conducive to longevity.”214 Another brief pointed out that there is a
strong link between same-sex marriage and early mortality.215 Since empirical science
does  not  support  the  claim  that  homosexuality  is  immutable,  but  does  indicate  that
homosexuality is associated with significant health risks, same-sex marriage should not
be legalized.  216 Unlike the petitioners' arguments that same-sex marriage bans express
animus  against  same-sex  couples,  this  brief  argues  that  “it  would  be  neither
compassionate  nor  kind  to  normalize  and  encourage  a  known and  significant  public
health risk such as homosexuality.”217 Banning same-sex marriage is considered to be an
act  of  kindness  to  the  LGBT  community.  Jon  Simmons  agrees  in  his  brief:  “If
212 Ibid.
213 Brief for Foundation for Moral Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 
576 U.S. ___ (2015).
214 Ibid.
215 Brief for Mike Huckabee Policy Solutions and Family Research Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
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homosexuality is, as its opponents say empirical evidence demonstrates, not normal or
natural but rather predominantly a manifestation of developmental trauma or dysfunction
then institutionalizing it is a supreme disservice to those many who have successfully
abandoned  the  lifestyle.”218 In  this  way,  homosexuality  is  coded  as  a  deviant,  and
ultimately destructive, lifestyle choice that should not be institutionalized in the form of
same-sex marriage. For the sake of the health of adults and children, the government
must ensure that same-sex marriage will not be legalized. The harm to families, children
and society would be far too great if the Courts were to decide in favor of same-sex
marriage.
Rights-based arguments
Petitioners
Ten out  of fourteen amicus  briefs operated from the almost-unstated premise that
marriage  was  a  fundamental  right  guaranteed  by the  Constitution.  They  argued  that
marriage  bans  violated  the  14th amendment's  guarantees  of  equal  protection  and  due
process.219 The  right  of  same-sex  couples  to  marry  the  person  of  their  choosing
“indisputably falls within the narrow band of specially protected liberties that this Court
ensures are protected from unwarranted curtailment.”220  These briefs espouse the idea
that  nothing  but  full  marriage  rights  fulfills  the  equal  protection  clause.221 Same-sex
relationships,  since  they are  just  the  same as  any other  relationship,  should  be  fully
recognized by the law.222
218 Brief for Jon Simmons.
219 Brief for Kenneth B. Mehlman.
220 Ibid.
221 Brief for Bay Area Lawyers.
222 Brief for PFLAG, Inc.
80
The petitioners base this conception of the right to marry on earlier Court decisions.
The Court has consistently upheld marriage as a fundamental right, protected the freedom
to marry the spouse of one's choice and supported the dignity of all marriages.223 The
Court  case most appealed to as precedent is  Loving v.  Virginia  (1967).  This decision
argued that the liberty to marry has long been considered a personal right essential to the
pursuit of happiness.224 The precedent set by Loving should therefore dictate the decision
of the Court. Contrary to the position of the respondents, these briefs argue that “the
decision to deny same-sex couples the right to marry … is nothing more than an effort to
defend the indefensible.”225 There is no legitimate reason under the law to deny same-sex
couples this right.  By legalizing same-sex marriage,  the Court were merely be giving
“'their lawful conduct a lawful status.'”226
Each of the petitioners' amicus briefs made essentially the same argument that “civil
marriage is a civil right that all Americans are entitled to enjoy, whatever their religious
identity  or  sexual  orientation.”227 The  right  to  marry is  guaranteed  to  all  Americans,
including same-sex couples. In these briefs, this right to marry is not even disputed; to
that end, if the Court is dedicated to protecting the rights of all Americans, they have no
other option but to allow for same-sex marriage. One brief states it the best: “Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the majority cannot treat the members of a minority group as
disfavored persons. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to all people—regardless of
race, sexual orientation, or other group characteristics—equality of rights, including the
223 Brief for Massachusetts, et al. See also Brief for Ninety-Two Plaintiffs.
224 Brief for PFLAG, Inc.
225 Brief for Equality Ohio, et al.
226 Brief for American Public Health Association.
227 Brief for the California Council of Churches, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
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fundamental  right  to  marry.  These  protections  are  the  'supreme  Law  of  the  Land,'
overriding  laws  enacted  through  the  democratic  process,  whether  adopted  by  state
legislatures or by the voters. For that reason, it is constitutionally irrelevant that popular
or  legislative  minorities  may  wish  to  consign  same-sex  couples  to  a  second-class
status.”228 In these briefs' construction of the rights associated with marriage, it matters
not if the state wishes to bar same-sex couples from marrying. To defer to the states'
authority in this matter is to misunderstand the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
equal  protection,  “which  protects  all  persons  from  state-sponsored  discrimination,
including the petitioners in these cases and all other gay men and lesbians who wish to
exercise  their  right  to  marry”  and  to  disregard  “vital  principles  of  constitutional
supremacy.”229 The equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution demand
no  other  outcome  than  the  legalization  of  marriage  for  all,  regardless  of  sexual
orientation.230
Respondents
Each of  the  respondents'  amicus  briefs  disputed  the  petitioners'  claims  in  various
ways. One argued that there is not an unlimited right to marry, i.e., a blanket statement
than  anyone  can  marry  anyone  else  they  wish.  One  brief  differentiated  between  the
228 Brief for Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
229 Ibid.
230 One of the briefs did not specifically address the topic of legalizing same-sex marriage, but rather the 
second question of the case: Do states have to recognize same-sex marriages performed out of state? 
This brief argued from a position of the fundamental right attached to marriage. They stated that “[t]he 
right to make personal decisions with respect to marital relationships is rendered meaningless if states 
can refuse to recognize disfavored classes of marriages without a constitutionally permissible basis” 
(Brief for Conflict of Laws and Family Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015)). This brief expanded the argument of the other briefs by 
stating that states did not have the constitutional right to deny recognition of same-sex marriages. In 
fact, they posited that this fundamental right to marry means little if states are not required to recognize 
same-sex marriages from other states.
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“rights of marriage” and the “right to marry.” The rights of marriage include the “legal
and economic incidents of marriage,” the “many related but separable rights, privileges
and benefits” that accrue to married couples. However, these rights of marriage are very
different from the right to marry, which demands “the adoption of a public policy placing
the state's imprimatur of approval on the couple's relationship, conduct or lifestyle.”231
This respondent argued that same-sex couples have the rights of marriage, but not the
right to marry. The rights of marriage—the legal and economic benefits—are guaranteed
to same-sex couples under the Constitution, but the right  to  marry, to be recognized by
law as a married couple, is not a fundamental right because it requires the government to
place its stamp of approval on a relationship. Such conferral of the “reputational” value
of marriage is not required by law to be given to same-sex couples.232
Another  brief argued that marriage is  a fundamental  right,  but  only in relation to
procreation.233 Separate the right to marry from marriage's natural procreative capacity,
and it is no longer a fundamental right. This brief called out the petitioners' argument that
“the fundamental right to marry is based on the freedom to choose one's spouse.” Said
argument  “disregard[s]  the  procreative  significance  of  marriage.”234 Instead,  this
respondent  argued  that  the  fundamental  right  to  marry  is  based  on  the  procreative
capability of a  man and a woman within marriage.  By untethering marriage from its
procreative significance, the fundamental right to marry disappears.
A related argument in a couple of the briefs deals with the right of children to know
231 Brief for Lary S. Larson.
232 Ibid.
233 Brief for Michigan Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
234 Ibid.
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their biological mother and father. Dawn Stefanowicz and Denise Shick's brief argues
that “[t]he most basic need—the fundamental right—of any child is to have a real father
and a real mother, committed to one another in marriage, and committed unreservedly to
the well-being of their children.”235 Allowing same-sex couples access to the institution of
marriage would deprive children of that fundamental right and disregard their needs.236
Another brief argued that issuing same-sex marriage licenses would “impair or destroy
the  child's  presumptive,  constitutional  right  to  her  mother  and  father.”237 Under  this
construction, the right to marry the person of one's choosing and the right of children to
know their biological mother and father are pitted against each other, and the child's right
should necessarily win out over the same-sex couples' right.
Others agree with the petitioners about the fact that there is a fundamental right to
marry, but the question lies in the definition of marriage being used. The respondents
argue that marriage is solely defined between a man and a woman, and attempting to say
there is a fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry is in fact a nonsensical claim.
A further  section  will  deal  with  the definitional  argument  in  more depth,  but  certain
points may be made here. One brief succinctly laid out the logic behind this position:
“The Court recognized that marriage is a fundamental right. The Court then redefined
marriage to include same-sex unions. The Court then announced that the right to enter
into same-sex unions is a fundamental right to be accorded strict scrutiny. But calling a
same-sex union a marriage does not make it a marriage, any more than calling a tail a leg
means a dog has five legs.”238 In other words, marriage connotes a certain definition for
235 Brief for Dawn Stefanowicz and Denise Shick.
236 Ibid.
237 Brief for Liberty Scholars and the Thomas More Society of Dallas.
238 Brief for Foundation for Moral Law.
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respondents—namely,  a commitment between one man and one woman for life—and
therefore, the right to marry is the right to enter into such a union. It does not, nor will it
ever, involve a right for same-sex couples to enter into the union, unless a redefinition of
terms  occurs.  Supporting  a  same-sex  right  to  marry  “assumes  the  conclusion  of  the
matter, i.e., that marriage as newly defined is a fundamental right, in the premise of the
question  without  acknowledging  that  a  change  in  terms  has  occurred.”239 The  Court
would have to “establish a new constitutional right to homosexual marriage”—which,
according to many other briefs, is a contradiction in terms—in order for the petitioners'
claims  to  hold  water.240 Marriage  has  its  own  particular  definition,  and  “redefining
marriage as a civil right based on our sexual desires is ill advised.”241 More discussion
about the definitional value of marriage will occur later in this chapter.
Two other  briefs  argued  that  there  is  no  historical  basis  for  a  right  to  same-sex
marriage: “There is no historical foundation for a liberty interest in marrying a person of
the same sex. It follows that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of 'due process of law'
does not include such a right”242; “This Court has never held that there is a fundamental
right to same sex marriage.”243 One expanded on this point by stating the following: “It is
self-evident that the concept of same-sex marriage is universally novel as of the late 20 th
century, and is wholly devoid of any prior historical traction with the language and nature
239 Brief for Richard A. Lawrence as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 
U.S. ___ (2015).
240 Brief for Texas Eagle Forum and Steven F. Hotze, M.D. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
241 Brief for Jon Simmons.
242 Brief for Earl M. Maltz, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 
U.S. ___ (2015).
243 Brief for Judicial Watch as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 
___ (2015).
85
of  fundamental  or  unalienable  rights.”  The  brief  goes  on  to  state  that  the  source  of
unalienable  rights  is  the  Bible.  Consequently,  since  there  is  no  support  for  same-sex
marriage within the Bible, same-sex marriage cannot be a fundamental right.244
Each of the respondents' briefs present different reasons for rejecting a fundamental
right  to  same-sex  marriage.  Note  that  they  do  not  dispute  the  fact  that  there  is  a
fundamental right to marry, just the claim that there is no fundamental right to marry
someone of the same sex. They present their arguments in various terms, citing tradition,
other rights, and definitions, among others, but they come to the same conclusion: The
Court  does  not  require  same-sex  marriage  because  there  is  no  fundamental  right  for
people to marry someone of the same sex. This argument stands in sharp contrast with the
petitioners' briefs, who argue that there is a fundamental right to marry a person of one's
own choosing—including someone of the same sex.
Role/interest of government (state/federal)
Petitioners
Eight briefs mentioned that it was well within the “appropriately narrow and modest
role  of  government”  to  allow  same-sex  marriage.245 There  are  many  governmental
interests that are served by marriage, such as the reinforcement of stable family bonds,
economic interdependence and security, and increased well-being for both parents and
children. By refusing same-sex marriage, the government works against these interests.246
The brief pointed out that legalizing same-sex marriage would not weaken the States'
ability to impose reasonable restrictions of marriage, as long as those restrictions are in
244 Brief for Rev. John T. Rankin.
245 Brief for Kenneth B. Mehlman.
246 Brief for Massachusetts, et al.
86
service of  legitimate  governmental  interests.  The States  are  free to  place  “reasonable
regulations” on marriage, just like they were before, but the only difference is that they
are  not  free  to  impose  discriminatory  policies  based  merely  on  gender  or  sexual
orientation.247 If the State is truly committed to promoting the well-being of families and
increasing economic interdependence, thereby increasing the prosperity of the nation as a
whole, they should legalize same-sex marriage.
By  refusing  same-sex  marriage,  the  state  is  essentially  stating  that  same-sex
households  are  not  recognized  “as  a  true  'family'—a  designation  that  is  uniquely
conferred in our society by the institution of marriage.”248 One justification for this ban is
the  so-called  “optimal  parenting”  model,  wherein  a  household  with  both  a  married
mother and father is considered the prime environment for raising children. Under this
odel, same-sex marriage should not be legalized merely because they are considered to be
a  “suboptimal  setting  for  raising  children.”  The  only  problem is  that  if  that  were  a
justifiable state interest,  far more couples would be barred from marrying and raising
children.  Instead,  these  bans  serve  only  to  discriminate  against  same-sex  couples  in
particular, and “[a] desire to mark the relationships and parenting abilities of same-sex
couples as less worthy of respect  is  an impermissible interest,  under any standard of
constitutional review.”249 Such a plainly discriminatory ban cannot be justified under the
law by any state or federal government. Thus, there is no legitimate state interest served
by disallowing same-sex marriage; instead, these laws are only meant to degrade and
demean same-sex couples. These relationship should be protected from such unwarranted
247 Ibid., see also Brief for Conflict of Law and Family Law Professors.
248 Brief for Kenneth B. Mehlman.
249 Brief for The Alliance State Advocates for Women's Rights and Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
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treatment by reaffirming the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process and equal
protection.250
Respondents
The eight amicus curiae in support of the respondents argue that the State only has a
legitimate interest in preserving the 'traditional' definition of marriage between a man and
a woman. As a result, the state will not sanction and validate same-sex marriages, and it
should be required to do so by a federal court.251 The briefs provide a couple of different
justifications for this perspective. 
Several  briefs  argue  that  restricting  marriage  to  opposite-sex  couples  promotes
legitimate state interests.252 These legitimate state interests most often involve the well-
being of children. Other briefs expand on this point by linking marriage, and all of its
attendant benefits, with the naturally procreative capacity of the union. The State does not
have a “legitimate—much less compelling—interest in the romantic lives of citizens as
such,” but they do have a legitimate interest in the children that might result from such a
union.253 The State is able to make the decision to “recognize, benefit, and burden only
the  naturally  procreative  union,”  which  contributes  to  increased  stability  and
independence  within  the  family  unit.254 The  State  may  be  required  to  “sanction
homosexual conduct,” as they did in Lawrence v. Texas by decriminalizing such behavior,
but they are not required to grant same-sex couples recognition in the form of a marriage
license.  The  State  has  logical  and  compelling  interests  in  preserving  heterosexual
250 Brief for Constitutional Accountability Center.
251 Brief for American Freedom Law Center.
252 Ibid.
253 Brief for Ryan T. Anderson as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
___ (2015).
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marriage: “In limiting marriage to a man and a woman, a state may give support to the
biological fact that the physical human anatomy is intended for sexual relations between
a man and a woman with the possibility of conception and birth, regardless of what other
constitutionally protected conduct may be done in private.”255 In this way, “the States'
interest  in maintaining the traditional definition of marriage” is related to the way in
which “it furthers the government interest in child-rearing.”256 The state should not be
allowed to criminalize “alternative personal relationships,” like same-sex relationships,
but they also do not have to grant them the rights of marriage.257
Another brief argues that the State has a “legitimate state interest” in “the promotion
of moral values in society.” Consequently, “allowing same-sex couples to marry would
lessen the effectiveness of marriage as a means of promoting moral values.”258 The State
has  a  vested  interest  in  promoting  “traditional  marriage  and  sexual  morality,”  which
would ultimately be tarnished if they were to give their stamp of approval to same-sex
marriage. As a result, “[e]ach state should have the opportunity to evaluate whether, in its
own communities, the growing spirit of tolerance and equality justifies an evolution in
their societal views of morality.”259 In this  construction, the State's role is to promote
traditional moral values through the continued adherence to the heterosexual model of
marriage.
These  eight  briefs  argue  that  there  is  a  legitimate  state  interest  in  preserving the
traditional marriage between one man and a woman. The primary reason for states to
255 Brief of Richard A. Lawrence.
256 Brief for Judicial Watch.
257 Brief for Liberty Scholars and Thomas More Society of Dallas.
258 Brief for Lary S. Larson.
259 Ibid.
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preserve this  model is the continued well-being of the children that might occur as a
result of those unions. By preserving traditional marriage, the States are also preserving
traditional values—in their eyes, a worthy enough feat in and of itself.
Definition/value of marriage
Petitioners
The six petitioners' amicus briefs that mentioned this argument specifically referred to
marriage  as  a  unique  institution  in  human  society.  Each  of  the  briefs  present
interconnected definitions and values of marriage. They acknowledge that marriage is a
privileged institution within the United States. Marriage is also far more than a guarantor
of  certain  legal  and  economic  benefits.260 Instead,  it  is  the  single  strongest  sign  of
commitment and love that can be made between two people.261
Marriage is considered for both its legal and personal ramifications. The brief from
the state of Massachusetts highlights this dual nature of marriage: “Marriage is a central
organizing feature of our society, conferring exclusive rights, protections, and obligations
on married couples and their families. States promote marriage to ensure long-lasting
bonds between spouses  and to  provide a  solid  foundation  for  the families  they form
together.  Marriage  is  also  an  immensely  personal  commitment  involving  the  most
intimate and private aspects of life.” The brief particularly highlights the legal aspects of
marriage: “[marriage] creates economic and health benefits, stabilizes households, forms
legal bonds between parents and children, assigns providers to care for dependents, and
facilitates  property  ownership  and  inheritance.  Marriage  thus  provides  stability  for
260 Brief for Bay Area Lawyers.
261 Brief for PFLAG, Inc.
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individuals, families, and the broader community.”262 Marriage is viewed in the terms of
the benefits and advantages that accrue to those who have access to the institution. This
argument ties into the “harms to LGBT community” argument:  same-sex couples are
harmed through their exclusion from the legal and economic rights of marriage—which is
not justifiable, due to the 14th Amendment's equal protection and due process clauses.
However,  marriage  is  far  more  than  its  associated  legal  rights.  Marriage  is
fundamentally “a time-honored demonstration to family, friends, and the community of a
loving commitment and mutual responsibility between two people, and implies a return
promise by society to respect that commitment.”263 Marriage is portrayed as a way to
recognize the commitment of two loving individuals to one another. Marriage enables
two people to take care of one another, as well as their vulnerable relatives and family
members.264 Marriage is primarily about the recognition of a commitment between two
loving individuals, and the legal and economic benefits are secondary to that recognition.
One brief, in particular, is worth noting because it explicitly mentions the religious
aspects of marriage. All of the briefs mention that there are legal and personal aspects to
marriage, but only one acknowledges that there has long been a religious connotation to
marriage. The brief by the California Council of Churches acknowledges that marriage
has had an important place in the religious lives of most faith communities, who must
each  be  free  to  celebrate  marriage  on  its  own  terms.265 At  the  same  time,  they
acknowledge the fact that marriage has also traditionally been a secular institution, free
262 Brief for Massachusetts, et al.
263 Brief for Bay Area Lawyers.
264 Brief for Kenneth B. Mehlman.
265 Brief for California Council of Churches.
91
from religious limitations.266 Ultimately, the brief argues that marriage—both secular and
religious  marriage—should be recognized between any two individuals,  regardless  of
their  gender,  and it  is  the  right  of  churches  to  be  able  to  issue  marriage  licenses  to
whomever they wish. Such a brief does not fit into the prevailing pattern, but it does
provide a glimpse into the way religious interest groups frame the argument in favor of
same-sex marriage  and at  the  same time contextualizes  the  wide variety of  opinions
within religious organizations about the definition and value of marriage.
Respondents
All  of  the  respondents'  amicus  briefs  mentioned  the  definition  and/or  value  of
marriage. Much like the petitioners, they began by emphasizing the fact that marriage is a
unique  institution.  They  argue  that  marriage  has  its  own  nature,  properties,  and
purpose.267 Every amicus brief upheld the characterization of marriage as between a man
and a woman who join together for their own mutual betterment and procreation.268
Any  deviation  from  this  heterosexual  norm  requires  a  kind  of  redefinition  of
marriage. The respondents' amicus briefs argue that the petitioners are trying to redefine
an institution that has stood for thousands upon thousands of years—which they have no
right to do. One brief, submitted by Ryan T. Anderson, articulated clearly the differences
between these two perspectives on marriage: the conjugal view and the revisionist view.
Under  the  conjugal  view,  marriage  is  a  “comprehensive  union,”  characterized  by its
ability to “join[ing] spouses in body as well as in mind.” This union “is begun by consent
and sealed by sexual intercourse.” Since sexual intercourse is “the act by which new life
266 Ibid.
267 Brief for American Freedom Law Center.
268 Ibid.
92
is  made,  it  is  especially  apt  for—and  deepened  by  procreation.”  In  addition,  since
marriage  is  a  comprehensive union—joining together  a  man and a  woman in  an all-
encompassing way—it is “permanent and exclusive,” not given to annulment or divorce
on a whim. However,  on the flip  side,  this  brief  argues  that  proponents  of same-sex
marriage are advocating for a “revisionist view” of marriage, defined as an emotional
union, deepened by any consensual sexual activity and yet valuable as long as “love,”
considered as a feeling,  lasts.  Same-sex marriage would replace the conjugal view of
marriage with the revisionist view, where marriage is only distinguishable from other
forms of companionship by its romantic element.269 According to this definition, there
would be no way to allow same-sex couples to marry without radically changing the face
of marriage itself, and that, according to Anderson and the rest of the respondents' amici,
would be incredibly dangerous to the institution of marriage and society in general.
Other briefs argue that there is unique value in heterosexual marriages that benefit
children and society in a way that same-sex marriages cannot.270 The core purpose of
marriage is the establishment of a stable institution for the protection of children, which
would be threatened by same-sex marriage.271 In the minds of the petitioners, redefining
marriage to include any loving, committed relationship between two people would be
dangerous, in that it would primarily “assign[s] legal import to same-sex role-playing,
only imitating what is attained by natural heterosexual pairing.”272 Not all of the briefs
present the argument in such loaded terminology, but many agree that giving same-sex
couples the status of marriage would be a dangerous redefinition of terms that would
269 Brief for Ryan T. Anderson.
270 Brief for Dawn Stefanowicz and Denise Shick.
271 Brief for Earl M. Maltz, et al.
272 Brief for Jon Simmons.
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ultimately construct marriage as a “romantic-emotional union” based mostly on love, and
not the “natural” complementarity of men and women and their ability to procreate.273
One final argument, based primarily on the assumption that petitioners are seeking a
redefinition of marriage, is that “[t]he role of defining marriage and implementing laws in
regard to it has always been primarily the province of the States.”274 Thus, even if there
was a  basis  for  redefining marriage,  it  would  be  the  responsibility of  the  citizens  to
engage in that process, not the Courts. Note how this is the flip side of the argument that
the  States  have  a  right  to  uphold  the  “traditional”  definition  of  marriage  against  the
perceived dangers it faces due to same-sex marriage.
Although each of the briefs express their ideas in slightly different terms, they all
support the “essential” nature of marriage as between a man and a woman and argue that
there is no legitimate governmental interest that would justify a redefinition of marriage.
If the Court does approve same-sex marriage, they would not have given these couples
access  to  an  institution  previously  barred  to  them,  but  rather,  they  would  redefined
marriage itself.275 For the sake of the institution of marriage itself, and for the children
that  naturally  emerge  from such a  union,  there  is  no  credible  basis  for  “redefining”
marriage to include same-sex couples. 
Tradition
Petitioners
The petitioners' amici argue predominantly that tradition is not itself a “permissible
justification”  for  the  discriminatory marriage  bans.276 They commonly cite  Loving  v.
273 Brief for Ryan T. Anderson. See also Brief for Rev. John T. Rankin.
274 Brief for Judicial Watch.
275 Brief for Richard A. Lawrence.
276 Brief for Kenneth B. Mehlman.
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Virginia as  evidence  for  the  fact  that  the  Court  itself  does  not  consider  tradition  a
“rational justification” for the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. If tradition was a
justifiable reason, then the decision in Loving v. Virginia would have upheld the right of
states to ban inter-racial marriages.277 Both the lower and the upper courts have denied the
respondents' idea of tradition as a compelling justification for these marriage bans.278 
Part of the reason why tradition is not compelling justification is tied into the role and
interest of government. In order for the bans to survive constitutional scrutiny, they must
be tied to a “legitimate governmental interest  that is independent of the disadvantage
imposed on a particular group.” The bans are not tethered to any legitimate governmental
interest of this kind. The fact that “they may continue a long tradition of exclusion is not
enough”  for  the  continued  maintenance  of  these  marriage  bans279 Denying  same-sex
marriage  enforces  the  idea  that  LGBT citizens  deserve to  be treated as  second-class.
Tradition cannot be a “rationale” for “discrimination by multiple states” against same-sex
couples. Tradition is outright rejected in all but one of the petitioners' briefs.280
In this singular brief, the filer prevailed upon a different conception. Legalizing same-
sex marriage in fact serves the traditional values of “responsibility, fidelity, commitment
and stability” previously exemplified by the heterosexual family unit. These values would
be much better served by ending the governmental ban on same-sex marriage.281
Respondents
For  the  respondents,  the  tradition  argument  is  intimately  tied  up  in  the
277 Brief for Equality Ohio, et al.
278 Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc., et al.
279 Brief for Massachusetts, et al.
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definition/value of marriage argument. These briefs argue that marriage, from its earliest
conception,  has  a  universal  symbolism independent  of  its  legal  and economic  rights.
Granting a marriage license is more than a piece of paper; it is a honor conferring many
reputational benefits. Marriage recognizes that a couple can establish a home and bring
children into the world. It also confers society's approval onto their relationship and their
conduct.282 By upholding the marriage bans states are doing nothing more than adhering
to the “longstanding tradition affirming conjugal marriage.”283 
The respondents point directly to the fact that traditional marriage between a man and
a woman “arose independently of any claimed discrimination” against same-sex couples.
The continued adherence to the traditional model of same-sex marriage does not express
an animus against same-sex couples, but rather a respect for the definition of marriage as
the union of one man and one woman for the purposes of procreation that has been shared
by generations and generations.284 Such a unit ensures stability and increases the chances
that children will be raised by their  biological mother and father within the bonds of
marriage, which traditionally has been understood as the optimal environment for raising
children.285 Regardless of society's opinion about homosexuality or same-sex marriage,
heterosexual marriage has historically been considered essential for promoting the public
welfare.286
The flip side of this argument is that homosexual marriage is not rooted in historical
tradition.  The  idea  of  same-sex  marriage  was  “universally  novel”  until  the  late  20th
282 Brief for Lary S. Larson.
283 Brief for Earl M. Maltz, et al.
284 Brief for Michigan Catholic Conference.
285 Brief for Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D.
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century.  This relatively recent concept is inconsistent with the language of unalienable
rights. In other words, since there is no historical basis for same-sex marriage within the
Anglo-American tradition, and there was not at the time of the Founders, it cannot be
legalized  under  the  14th Amendment.  Tradition  matters,  and  both  arguments—the
traditional notion of marriage between a man and a woman, and the lack of historical
precedent for same-sex marriage—support the continued ban on same-sex marriage.287
The respondents ultimately uphold the sanctity of tradition in this case.
Benefits to families, children and society
Petitioners
The petitioners' amici argue that allowing same-sex marriage would lead to numerous
benefits to families, children and society. Marriage, as the foundation of secure families,
reinforces  important  societal  values  like  commitment,  fidelity,  and  responsibility.288
Permitting  civil  marriage  for  same-sex  couples  would  ultimately  lead  to  increased
stability  and  commitment,  as  well  as  greater  levels  of  happiness,  mental  health,  and
physical well-being.289 It almost goes without saying in these briefs that allowing same-
sex marriage offers  access to  the economic  benefits,  but  the recognition of  same-sex
marriage would also lead to numerous “intangible benefits,” like stability.290
One of the most important benefits offered to families and children is related to the
conferral of state approval on the relationship. Even though same-sex couples can receive
many  of  the  same  econommic  benefits  associated  with  marriage  from  domestic
287 Brief for Rev. John T. Rankin.
288 Brief for Kenneth B. Mehlman.
289 Brief for American Psychological Association. See also Brief for American Public Health Association, 
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partnerships or civil unions, there is a reputation attached to marriage, a sense of society's
approval, that cannot be achieved by any other institution. In PFLAG's brief, they quoted
a  woman who put  it  the  best:  “Having that  wedding ring  on  my finger  has  made a
tremendous difference in my day-to-day life. It tells everyone that I am in a committed
relationship  that  is  worthy  of  the  greatest  recognition  that  civil  society  can  offer.
Critically, it also tells our daughter that the State recognizes us as a family, and that there
is  nothing second-class about her parents'  commitment.”291 Marriage is  far  more than
economic  benefits;  there  are  intrinsic  psychological  and  emotional  benefits  that  are
necessary if same-sex couples are going to be granted an equal status with opposite-sex
couples.
One brief in particular touches upon the unique benefits given to children of same-sex
couples. Just like same-sex marriage would improve the well-being of same-sex couples,
the legalization of same-sex marriage improves the well-being of children by conferring
equal value on their relationships and consequently strengthening their families.292 These
benefits can be economic in nature, giving families increased access to health insurance
and job benefits,  for  example.  Yet  they can  also  indicate  to  these  children  that  their
families are just as dignified and worthy of respect as any heterosexual family. These
children grow up knowing that they are on an equal footing with every other child. The
equality of their family in the eyes of the law can only be a benefit, not a hindrance to
these children of same-sex couples.
The  petitioners  ultimately  argue  that  same-sex  marriage  would  be  incredibly
291 Brief for PFLAG, Inc.
292 Brief for Massachusetts, et al.
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beneficial  to  same-sex  couples  and  their  families.  Equality  under  the  law  leads  to
increased stability and commitment, along with innumerable economic benefits. Since
one of the key concerns of the State is the well-being of its people, and allowing same-
sex  marriage  would  ensure  the  increased  well-being  of  a  significant  subset  of  its
population, the State only has one logical choice: to legalize same-sex marriage and grant
these families and children their rightful benefits under the law.
Respondents
Only four out of the 14 briefs mentioned the benefits to families, children and society.
In  their  estimation,  traditional  marriage  supports  the  common  good.293 These  briefs
explicitly  point  out  that  traditional  marriage  confers  unique  benefits  on  children  and
argue that such a definition of marriage must be enforced at all costs: “[m]arriage needs
to remain a societal foundation that constitutes, represents, and defends the inherently
procreative  relationship  between  the  husband  and  the  wife  for  the  welfare  of  their
biological children and society.”294 Under this construction, only the union of a man and a
woman in civil marriage confers any intangible benefits, like stability and commitment,
and general  health  and well-being to  families  and society.  The rejection of  same-sex
marriage would lead to increased stability and serve the “greater good.”295
One brief flat-out exhorts the Court to reject the Petitioners' arguments. They argue
that this action would be an expression of “true compassion and kindness for the benefit
of millions of American young people,  who, as a function of behavioral and lifestyle
choices encouraged by unwise or uncaring public policy decrees, would otherwise die
293 Brief for Michigan Catholic Conference.
294 Brief for Dawn Stefanowicz and Denise Shick.
295 Brief for Jon Simmons.
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early.”296 The brief constructs homosexuality as a health risk that cannot be condoned by
a government focused on the good of its people. After all, no legitimate Court would
sanction a public health risk like homosexuality, which, according to the brief, leads to an
increased risk of mortality due to disease and other biological factors.297 The Court, if it
were truly compassionate,  truly looking out for the benefits  of families and children,
would not legalize same-sex marriage. 
Harms to (heterosexual) families, children and society
Petitioners
The petitioners' amici present unambiguous answers to the question of whether same-
sex marriage would cause harm to heterosexual couples and their families. They state that
there is “no evidence that marriage between individuals of the same sex affects opposite-
sex couples' decisions about procreation, marriage, divorce, or parenting whatsoever.”298
Precisely because same-sex couples also commit to the institution of marriage, there is no
risk posed to heterosexual couples by legalization of same-sex marriage.299
Respondents
The respondents'  amici  construct same-sex marriage as an existential  threat to the
institution of traditional marriage. Legalizing same-sex marriage would be done at the
peril of society and the greater good.300 Including same-sex couples in the institution of
marriage would change its “social meaning” in ways that would “undermine the public
goods  historically  served  by  laws  defining  marriage  as  the  conjugal  husband-wife
296 Brief for Mike Huckabee Policy Solutions and Family Research Institute.
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union.”301 By redefining marriage, the government would be actively harming spouses,
children, and the larger community.302
The briefs  offer  several  reasons for  this  perceived harm. One brief  mentions that
redefining same-sex marriage would teach that there is no difference between mothers
and  fathers,  and  therefore,  the  “optimal  model”  for  raising  children  would  be
undermined.303 They  also  argue  that  same-sex  marriage  would  “contribute  to  an
atmosphere  or  culture  of  general  sexual  freedom and  promiscuity”  and  increase  the
occurrences  of  out-of-wedlock  pregnancy.304 Same-sex  marriage  will  also  prevent
children  from  establishing  bonds  with  both  biological  parents.305 The  respondents
universally acknowledge that children have the right to know their biological parents, and
there will be long-term consequences when children are not allowed this access. A child
who does not know their biological mother and father is being taught, according to Dawn
Stefanowicz and Denise Shick, that what they need does not matter.306
Other briefs touch upon the fact that homosexuality has historically been associated
with  public  health  risks,  like HIV/AIDS. They point  to  studies  that  have shown that
homosexuality is a “known and significant public health risk.” Therefore legalizing same-
sex marriage would be “self-injurious,” putting unwanted financial, emotional and health
burdens on survivors, including children, and society as a whole.307 Couples will contract
dangerous  diseases,  children  will  be  left  without  their  mother  and  father,  and  wider
301 Brief for Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D.
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society will suffer if same-sex marriage is allowed.
Other briefs emphasize the moral degradation that would occur as the result of same-
sex marriage. Jon Simmons argues that the norms of his society would be eroded if the
judiciary redefines marriage. Marriage is “the central pillar for the traditional family, his
community's  primary  forum  for  training  and  modeling  of  values,  respect,  and
tolerance.”308 If  marriage is  redefined,  these positive benefits  would be degraded and
possibly eliminated altogether. This kind of moral degradation should be avoided at all
costs.
Two other briefs emphasize the fact that same-sex marriage is inherently “an entirely
novel and untried idea” that poses unique dangers to the United States.309 In essence,
these briefs argue that there is no way to tell what the ultimate consequences of this
decision will be. By legalizing same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court would essentially
be “jettisoning” the right of the people to decide whether to legalize same-sex marriage
on their own and deciding that the courts alone have the right to decide.310 Such an idea is
inherently dangerous. Another brief states that a ruling in favor of the petitioners would
“create a new constitutional right to homosexual marriage” that would be “extraordinarily
divisive to our Nation, mostly along regional lines.” The United States would eventually
fracture—much like it did in the 1860s over the issue of slavery—if “the Court attempts,
at it did in Dred Scott, to impose its own provincial view of a fundamental social issue on
the entire country.”311 This brief in particular poses a harrowing image of our future as a
country if the Court tells local voters they are wrong, their (conservative) political leaders
308 Brief for Jon Simmons.
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are wrong, and the Bible is wrong about marriage. The nation would in essence split into
two over this issue of same-sex marriage and lead to regional conflict similar to the Civil
War.312
Not all of the briefs speak about the harms posed by same-sex marriage in quite these
terms, but they undeniably believe that our society—in particular our family structure—
would be irreparably damaged if same-sex marriage is legalized. There is also no way of
knowing what the ultimate consequences of the decision would be. In this case, it would
be  far  better  to  stick  to  the  status  quo  and  protect  the  heterosexual  family  unit—
specifically, the right of children to know their biological parents. The risk far outweighs
any possible benefits which, incidentally, are not mentioned within these briefs.
Polygamy
Petitioners
Only  one  of  the  petitioners'  amicus  briefs  mentioned  the  issue  of  polygamy.  In
response to the respondents' argument that same-sex marriage would be the first step to
legalizing polygamy (see below), the California Council of Churches disputes that claim.
They  argue  that  Mormon  polygamy,  in  particular,  which  was  criminalized  in  prior
Supreme Court discussions, was rooted in patriarchal structures of inequality which led to
the  subjugation  of  women.  Same-sex  marriage,  on  the  other  hand,  is  rooted  in  the
recognition off the full humanity and equality of all citizens.313 Polygamy is rooted in
equality that  could never  receive due standing under  the Fourteenth Amendment,  but
same-sex marriage poses none of the same threats to democratic institutions.314 same-sex
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marriage  could  instead  be  seen  as  a  way  to  enforce  the  sanctity  of  our  democratic
institutions by ensuring full equality for all citizens.
Respondents
Six of the respondents advanced the exact opposite argument. If the Court is going to
legalize same-sex marriage, there is no way to limit that holding.315 The argument goes
like this: If the Supreme Court denies the sexual complementarity of men and women, if
they hold that laws defining marriage as between one man and one woman discriminates
against  same-sex couples  because  these couples  can also have  loving and committed
relationships, then there is no way to confine the holding to same-sex couples alone.316
The “concerns about personal autonomy,” the constitutional “right” to confer approval
upon same-sex rights, would naturally lead to bigamous or plural marriages, along with
the social sanction of incest and other societal ills.317 One brief goes on to say that if it is
constitutionally unsound to stand by the man-woman definition of marriage, it must also
be constitutionally unsound to advocate for monogamy within marriage, quoting DeBoer
v. Synder.318
Ultimately, the respondents put forth a kind of “slippery” slope argument. Once same-
sex couples are allowed to marry,  all  other non-traditional  couples have precedent  to
bring their own cases before the courts.319 Given the logic of stability and commitment
espoused by the petitioners, a ban on polygamy would therefore be difficult to defend.320
Chaos would be the “only foreseeable end” if same-sex marriage is legalized and every
315 Brief for American Freedom Law Center.
316 Brief for Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D.
317 Brief for Lary S. Larson.
318 Brief for Liberty Scholars and Thomas More Society of Dallas.
319 Brief for Rev. John T. Rankin.
320 Brief for Foundation for Moral Law.
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other non-traditional group finds fit to bring their case before the Supreme Court.321 To
avoid this chaos, the Supreme Court must hold that same-sex marriage is not legal.
* * *
From these 28 briefs  emerges several  key themes of argumentation: harms to the
LGBT  community;  rights-based  arguments;  the  role/interest  of  government;  the
definition/value of marriage; tradition; benefits to families, children, and society; harms
to  (heterosexual)  families,  children  and  society;  and  polygamy.  These  topics  can  be
divided into four separate categories: arguments from consequences, principle, definition,
and process.  Arguments from consequence explore the harms versus the benefits  that
would occur as a result of same-sex marriage. Arguments from principle examine what it
means for an individual to have rights: What are the rights guaranteed to all? How are
these rights protected by the government? In addition, they examine the role of tradition:
How should tradition be considered when making new laws? Should tradition rule, or
should the government seek a more progressive path? Arguments from definition explore
the meaning of marriage in general. Marriage is considered to be an important societal
institution  for  both  the  petitioners  and  respondents,  but  what  makes  marriage  so
important?  What is  the essence,  or the purpose,  of marriage? Lastly,  arguments from
process attempt to discern who should make the decision regarding same-sex marriage.
Should the states have the right to decide who gets to marry whom? Should the federal
government have the responsibility? What about the courts versus the legislatures? These
major points of argumentation characterize most, if not all, of the briefs in the sample.
In  the  following  section,  I  will  explore  precisely  what  the  substance  of  their
321 Brief for Rev. John T. Rankin.
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arguments means in  the broader  context of polarization.  Both sides address the same
topics—for example, harms to the LGBT community and the right of same-sex couples to
marry—but it remains to be seen whether they are truly talking in tandem with each other
or if they are talking past each other. The next chapter will take a closer look at some of
these  arguments  to  understand  the  points  of  agreement  and  contention  between  the
petitioners and the respondents. In order to truly understand where the other sides are
coming from, a closer look at some of their major claims will yield a better understanding
of the existing polarization.
This analysis is particularly pertinent since the Supreme Court eventually ruled in
favor of the petitioners. In this case, does that mean that the respondents' arguments are
no longer  valid  in  the larger  context  of  the same-sex marriage debate? Is  the debate
essentially over? The answer to that question is no, the debate over same-sex marriage
continues to rage over some of the same issues raised in the amicus briefs.  The next
chapter  will  examine  the  ways  in  which  the  larger  culture  of  polarization  has  been
expressed within this briefs and then will look ahead to the future, to see the ways in
which these briefs can predict, or shed some light on, the potential trajectory of future
polarization within the United States over this issue of same-sex marriage.
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CHAPTER SIX
Discussion and Conclusions
The 29 amicus briefs—and in particular, the 28 briefs from the petitioners and the
respondents—displayed a wide range of arguments. Before discussing the way in which
both  sides  diverge in  their  expression  of  these arguments,  however,  it  is  pertinent  to
discuss those commonalities, those points in which the two sides do come to some type of
common understanding.  Both  sides,  on  a  fundamental  level,  seem to  agree  what's  at
stake: the sanctity of marriage, the well-being and protection of adults and children, and
the inviolability of the Constitution. However, they disagree on how they are to preserve
the sanctity of marriage, the well-being and protection of adults and children, and the
inviolability of the Constitution. How are they to do so without sacrificing their essential
values, their solid beliefs on what they believe America is all about? They both have
different ideas about what it  means to do so. It  is  this  common understanding of the
stakes, and their disparate ideas on the proper way to retain the essential character of our
nation, that leads to—or at least contributes to—polarization. 
First, both sides agree that there is a sacred quality to the institution of marriage. The
six  petitioners'  amici  who  explicitly  mentioned  the  definition  and  value  of  marriage
argued that marriage is an incredibly privileged institution, more than any other in human
society. Marriage is more than economic or legal benefits; it is the deepest expression of
commitment that can be made between two people. In certain cases, both briefs even
agreed that there is a religious component to marriage that must be protected. On the
central question of the value of marriage, both sides have a fundamental commonality.
They both believe that marriage is important. However, what does it take to protect the
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institution  from  those  who  would  wish  to  harm  it?  The  answer  to  that  question  is
precisely what the petitioners and the respondents are laying out within their briefs, but
neither side has the same answer.
Both the petitioners' and the respondents' amici also held that the government should
have a role in protecting the well-being of its citizens, adults and children alike. Marriage
plays an integral role in securing the well-being of citizens, which both sides agree upon.
The  problem  lies  in  figuring  out  what  it  means  to  truly  protect  the  citizens.  The
petitioners' amici argue that the only way to protect families and children is by opening
up the institution of marriage to all, but the respondents' amici argue that legalizing same-
sex marriage would cause irreparable harm to families, children and society. The two
sides  thus  have  the  same motivation,  at  the  core,  to  make  sure  that  every citizen  is
protected and therefore society is  preserved. However,  the essential  conflict  seems to
arise when neither side can come to the same conclusion on what would truly secure this
well-being. 
In  addition,  both sides  believe  in  the  inviolability of  the  Constitution.  They both
consistently  look  to  the  Constitution  to  make  their  arguments.  The  petitioners,  for
example, argue that the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment
protect  the  rights  of  same-sex  couples  to  marry.  It  is  therefore  a  violation  of  their
constitutional  rights  to  deny  them  this  access.  The  respondents  also  look  to  the
Constitution  and,  in  many  cases,  they  agree  that  the  Constitution  does  grant  a
fundamental right to marry. However, they argue that allowing same-sex couples to marry
would be a intrusion into the sanctity of marriage. It is a contradiction in terms to say that
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there  is  a  right  to  same-sex  marriage,  because  marriage  has  never  been  defined  as
anything other than a male-female partnership. Yet this disagreement does not negate the
fact that both sides have a deep and enduring respect for the Constitution as the founding
document of the nation.
In this way, both sides appear to operate from the same basic set of assumptions:
marriage  is  an  important  institution  with  both  civic  and  religious  connotations;  the
government has a vested interest in protecting the well-being of adults and children; and
the Constitution is inviolable. In addition, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the two
sides  make the  same kinds  of  arguments  from principle,  consequence,  definition and
process. This similar focus implies that the petitioners and the respondents are thinking in
roughly  the  same  terms.  The  principles  supporting  the  decision,  the  consequences
resulting from the decision, the definition of marriage, the process used to determine the
outcome—all of these topics matter to the petitioners and the respondents alike. Where
they diverge, however, is their understanding of the “right” answer to those fundamental
questions of principle, consequence, definition, and process. They agree on what matters,
but they do not have the same conception of what it takes to secure what matters for
future  generations.  It  is  on  this  fundamental  disagreement  that  polarization  seems to
hinge, and the amicus briefs give expression to that fact.
On one level, the findings of this study seem to contradict Hunter's assertion that both
sides of the culture war fundamentally disagree on important issues and merely “talk past
one another.”322 In Hunter's conception of the culture wars, disagreement springs from
differing conceptions of the sacred, or the principles that orient the life of individuals and
322 Hunter, James Davison. “Culture Wars,” p. 131.
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the larger community. When divergent interest groups come into contact with each other,
these different opinions on the sacred is seen not as a mere disagreement, but an actual
desecration  of  the  group's  most  cherished  values.  However,  the  results  of  this  study
indicate  that  the  interest  groups  involved  in  the  same-sex  marriage  have  similar
conceptions  of  the  sacred.  The  petitioners'  and  respondents'  amici  agree  on  the
importance  of  marriage,  the  protection  of  children,  and  the  inviolability  of  the
Constitution.  The  interest  groups  at  issue  do  not  have  dissimilar  ideas  about  what
institutions  are  sacred.  Instead,  they  have  a  fundamental  disagreement  that  certain
institutions, like marriage and the Constitution, are essentially the backbone of the nation.
It is from this point of fundamental agreement that disagreements emerge.
Merely because both sides agree on what is important, that does not mean they agree
on everything else. They place the same level of importance on marriage, family, and the
Constitution, but their conclusions about these three diverge. For example, the petitioners
argued across their briefs that marriage's definition has two essential aspects: 1) its legal
and economic benefits, and 2) its nature as a symbol of commitment and love in the eyes
of  the government  and the community at  large.  In their  minds,  nothing characterizes
marriage more than those two facts. Its value arises from its ability to grant stability to
children, regardless of their biological heritage. On the other hand, respondents firmly
believe, as rooted and grounded in tradition, that marriage has only been understood as an
institution between a man and a woman. Some point to the religious underpinning of
marriage. Marriage also serves as an impetus for a couple to stay together to raise their
biological children, allowing both parents and children to know their biological families.
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Both sides know that marriage is important, but what makes marriage important? The two
cannot agree, and if they cannot agree on that one fact, then polarization on anything else
resulted to the institution is bound to result.
From these  differing  definitions  of  marriage  emerges  numerous  other  sources  of
contention. Take the issue of rights. The petitioners, arguing from a position that marriage
is valuable because of its legal/economic benefits and its reflection of commitment of a
loving couple, argue that same-sex couples should be given the right to marry. This right
is not dependent on the sex of the people involved, and it is in fact guaranteed by the due
process  and equal  protection  clauses  of  the  14th amendment.  On the  other  hand,  the
respondents argue that only heterosexuals can marry, under the traditional definition, and
therefore there is no fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry. Such a right is
inherently contradictory, a paradox in terms, equivalent to calling the tail of a dog a leg.323
What constitutes the right to marry? Why is marriage a fundamental right in the first
place? Different amici give different answers to these enduring, all-important questions.
Even if both sides agreed that there is a fundamental right to marry, however, another
conflict arises when people attempt to figure out the role of government in granting that
right.  The  petitioners  argue  that  the  federal  government—and  more  specifically,  the
Supreme Court—has the ability to determine whether same-sex couples are allowed to
marry, since it is a question that cuts right to the heart of the Constitutional guarantees of
equal protection and due process.  The respondents,  on the other hand, argue that the
decision should be left up to the states, which also has its rooting in the legal precedent of
state regulation of marriage. This argument from process was resolved, for the most part,
323 Brief for Rev. T. Rankin as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
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when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners in  Obergefell v. Hodges.  The
federal government, and specifically the Supreme Court, has the ability to decide whether
same-sex marriage is a fundamental right. As far as law is concerned, this argument is
closed.
However, that does not mean that the polarization regarding same-sex marriage has
dissipated. Indeed, the arguments from principle, consequence and definition still exist
within our contemporary society. Such arguments can help shed light on the expression of
polarization on the current  political  scene and become a springboard for speculations
about the future of polarization within the U.S. Just because the Court decided in favor of
the petitioners, that does not mean that the debate is over—far from it, in fact.
One chief reason for this continued polarization is exemplified in the arguments from
consequence.  To  put  it  simply,  no  one  knows  what  will  happen  now  that  same-sex
marriage is legal. The petitioners argued that same-sex marriage would help to protect
same-sex couples and rectify many of the harms to which the LGBT community has been
subject. Same-sex marriage will protect families and children by providing them with
stability and security not provided by domestic partnerships or civil unions. On the other
hand,  the  respondents  stated  exactly  the  opposite:  same-sex  marriage  would  harm
families, children, and society. One brief went so far as to say that same-sex marriage
would lead to widespread regional unrest and potentially trigger a civil war.324 While this
last  claim  may  or  may  not  be  exaggerated,  there  is  still  a  tremendous  degree  of
uncertainty related to same-sex marriage and its effects on society. For this reason alone,
324 Brief for Texas Eagle Forum and Steven F. Hotze, M.D. As Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
576 U.S. ___ (2015).
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the expressions of polarization within these briefs are not likely to dissipate in the near
future.
These  briefs  highlight  key  areas  of  controversy  between  same-sex  marriage
supporters and opponents that will continue to be relevant to the continued debate about
same-sex  marriage.  The  issue  hits  the  heart  of  fundamental  beliefs  about  marriage,
family,  and the Constitution that  will  continue to reverberate  throughout  society.  Our
definition  of  marriage,  our  protection  of  families,  and  our  understanding  of  the
Constitution will impact the future of our nation in myriad ways. The petitioners may
have “won” the judicial battle, but there is still a battle to be fought for the execution of
the law. The petitioners still have to win over the hearts and minds of those people who
truly believe that marriage should be reserved to a man and a woman. In return,  the
respondents have to fight against the ever-shifting tide. In many ways, now that the Court
has legalized same-sex marriage, they are fighting an uphill battle, but they are not going
to go down without giving it all they have. After all, they are fighting for nothing more or
less than the definition of the most important institution within our society. Under those
circumstances, it would be near-impossible to imagine a situation where one side would
simply give up.
The amicus briefs are only one medium through which the battle has been fought.
This  advocacy document,  so seemingly irrelevant  in  the grand scheme of things,  has
allowed interest groups to have a voice in a way that was unprecedented even fifty years
ago. These documents have provided a road map to explore many of the key points of
polarization  within  the  modern  same-sex marriage  debate,  to  distinguish  the  ways  in
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which both sides construct their argument. It has allowed us to see what matters to both
sides, the fundamental beliefs they hold in common and the core issues that divide them
irreparably.  The  amicus  briefs  provide  a  context  for  understanding  some  of  the  key
differences in thought between both of the parties and gain an understanding of exactly
why they cannot agree. The interested groups on both sides of the issue have fought to
influence the Supreme Court, but the battle is over something far more important: the
future of our nation. Hunter had it right: interest groups and elites are not fighting for
policy,  but  rather,  they are fighting for the culture—past,  present,  and future—of our
nation. In the issue of same-sex marriage, regardless of what side wins out in the end, the
face of marriage will be forever altered. Indeed, it already is, and the onus is on these
interest groups to decide how to respond now. The stakes have perhaps never been higher.
Future Research
Many avenues of future reach emerge from these findings. The logical question after
being presented with these findings is whether these results can be extrapolated out to the
broader  public  discourse  surrounding  same-sex  marriage.  Elites  often  construct  their
arguments  in  a  different  form than  regular  citizens.  In  the  case  of  amicus  briefs  in
particular, the language was highly geared toward influencing the Supreme Court. As a
result,  they often used legal jargon that might not necessarily be present in society at
large. One major outlying question following this research is whether individual citizens,
if given the chance, would use the same general themes and construct their arguments in
a similar fashion. To that end, future research could be done to analyze the content of
major newspaper articles to see whether the same arguments presented in the briefs occur
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in a similar fashion in broader society. One could also analyze the mission statements,
press releases and other documentation from the interest groups represented in the sample
to see if  they use the same arguments in appealing to the general population.  In any
research  project,  it  is  important  not  only  to  come  to  a  conclusion  but  to  see  if  the
conclusions  are  generalizable  to  society  at  large.  Further  research  should  be  geared
toward arriving at an answer to that question.
In addition, understanding the face of the culture war after this monumental decision
by the Court is essential. How are the two sides now relating to one another? What are
the main points of controversy, the hot-button issues, that support the oppositional nature
of the parties now that same-sex marriage is illegal? As the state and federal governments
aim to create laws honoring the judicial decision, new arguments will emerge and old
ones will be reshaped. Interest groups are now fighting a different battle than they were a
year ago. Future researchers could seek a more nuanced understanding of how these two
sides now relate to each other now that the battlefield has fundamentally changed. The
character of the debate and the consequences of this polarization have only begun to be
explored;  a  much  greater  understanding  is  needed.  In  the  future,  research  will
fundamental in the creation of this understanding.
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